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WASHINGTON : The United States is weighing potential logistical support for Israeli military action against Iran’s ballistic missile infrastructure if ongoing diplomatic efforts fail, according to sources familiar with internal national security discussions. The deliberations come as U.S. and Iranian officials prepare for a second round of indirect nuclear negotiations in Geneva this week, following initial talks held in Oman. The diplomatic track is proceeding alongside a visible expansion of U.S. military deployments in the Middle East.   Contingency Planning After Mar-a-Lago Meeting According to two individuals briefed on the matter, U.S. military and intelligence planning has increasingly focused on how Washington could assist Israel in the event of renewed strikes on Iranian missile facilities. The discussions follow a December meeting at Mar-a-Lago between President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. During that meeting, Trump informed Netanyahu that the United States would support Israeli military action targeting Iran’s missile program if Washington and Tehran are unable to reach a negotiated agreement, the sources said. Current U.S. deliberations are centered less on Israel’s operational capability and more on the mechanics of potential American assistance. Among the options under consideration is providing aerial refueling for Israeli combat aircraft to extend their operational range during long-distance missions.   Airspace Access Remains a Key Constraint One of the primary operational challenges involves securing overflight permissions. Any potential Israeli strike on Iran would require transit through the airspace of neighboring states. Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates have issued public statements declaring they would not permit their airspace to be used for strikes against Iran or for retaliatory Iranian attacks directed at third-party countries. These positions complicate potential routing options and factor into U.S. and Israeli military planning.   Expanded U.S. Naval Presence At the same time, the United States has expanded its naval footprint in the region. Four U.S. officials confirmed that the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford and its accompanying carrier strike group are being deployed to the Middle East from the Caribbean. The carrier will join an existing U.S. naval presence that includes the USS Abraham Lincoln. Speaking at the White House, President Trump described the deployment of the USS Gerald R. Ford as “prudent insurance” in the event negotiations with Iran do not produce results. The additional carrier strike group increases U.S. naval capabilities in the region during a period of diplomatic engagement.   Second Round of Talks in Geneva The military posture coincides with continued diplomatic efforts to reach a nuclear understanding with Tehran. After an initial round of indirect negotiations in Oman, U.S. and Iranian representatives are scheduled to meet again in Geneva on Tuesday. Iranian state media, corroborated by the Associated Press, reported that Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and a delegation are traveling to Geneva for the talks. Iranian officials have indicated a conditional willingness to curb certain elements of their uranium enrichment activities in exchange for sanctions relief, though specific terms have not been publicly defined and no written agreement has been announced. Representing the United States, envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner are traveling to Switzerland to participate in the discussions. Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirmed their travel plans on Sunday, describing the meetings as important and reiterating that President Trump prefers a diplomatic resolution. “We’ll see how that comes out,” Rubio said.   Israeli Position on Scope of Any Agreement Prime Minister Netanyahu has maintained a cautious stance toward the diplomatic process. During a visit to Washington last week, he held talks with President Trump and reiterated Israel’s position that any agreement with Iran must extend beyond its nuclear program. Netanyahu has repeatedly stated that a prospective accord should include strict limitations on Iran’s ballistic missile development and a full halt to Iranian support for proxy groups operating across the Middle East. As negotiations resume in Geneva, U.S. military contingency planning, expanded regional deployments, and continued diplomatic engagement are proceeding in parallel under a dual-track approach.

Read More → Posted on 2026-02-16 13:52:35

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TOKYO / KAWASAKI, : On 12 February 2026, Lockheed Martin has formally issued its first production purchase order to Fujitsu Limited for a key radar subsystem component supporting Japan’s Aegis System Equipped Vessel (ASEV) program. The agreement converts a memorandum of understanding signed in May 2025 into an active manufacturing contract and establishes Fujitsu as an official supplier within the SPY-7 radar industrial base. The purchase order covers production of the SPY-7 Subarray Suite Power Supply Line Replaceable Unit (PS LRU), a core module integrated into the radar’s antenna architecture. With this step, a portion of SPY-7 manufacturing will now be based in Japan, supporting domestic production capability and long-term sustainment requirements for the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF).   Power Supply Line Replaceable Unit (PS LRU): Role and Design The PS LRU provides regulated electrical power and control functions to dedicated radar subarrays within the SPY-7 system. Designed as a Line Replaceable Unit, the module can be removed and replaced in operational environments, including at sea or in dockyard conditions, without extensive system disassembly. This modular configuration reduces maintenance downtime, simplifies lifecycle logistics, and enables faster return-to-service timelines. Local production of the PS LRU enhances Japan’s capacity to independently maintain critical elements of its ballistic missile defense radar infrastructure. The SPY-7 system incorporates solid-state transmit and receive modules, improving reliability and reducing maintenance demands compared with legacy vacuum tube-based radar technologies. At the signing ceremony, Chandra Marshall, Vice President and General Manager at Lockheed Martin, stated that the agreement advances the establishment of a Japan-based supply chain for the ASEV’s SPY-7 radar. Kenichiro Miyazaki, Senior Vice President and Head of the National Security Business Unit at Fujitsu, confirmed the company’s role in strengthening Japan’s domestic production and sustainment framework.   SPY-7 Radar Architecture and Capabilities Developed by Lockheed Martin, the SPY-7 radar is built on solid-state, gallium nitride (GaN)-based active electronically scanned array (AESA) technology. The radar is composed of scalable radar module assemblies arranged to provide wide-area coverage across multiple azimuth sectors. Program data indicates that SPY-7 delivers detection performance several times greater than the legacy SPY-1 radar systems currently deployed on Japan’s older Aegis destroyers. The system is engineered for high sensitivity and discrimination against complex air and missile threats, including small, high-speed ballistic targets operating in cluttered environments. Through digital beamforming and advanced signal processing, SPY-7 performs search, tracking, and missile guidance functions simultaneously without mechanical rotation. In ballistic missile defense operations, the radar can detect ascent-phase trajectories, maintain continuous tracking during midcourse flight, and provide fire-control-quality data to interceptor systems. It also supports precision tracking of conventional air threats, including low-flying cruise missiles, at ranges potentially extending several hundred kilometers. The radar’s open architecture design enables interoperability with external sensors and combat systems. Via secure data links and cooperative engagement frameworks, SPY-7 can share tracking data with shipborne interceptors, airborne early warning platforms, and allied naval units operating within integrated task groups.   ASEV Program Structure and Platform Specifications Japan selected SPY-7 for its ASEV fleet following the cancellation of the Aegis Ashore program in June 2020. Transitioning the ballistic missile defense mission to sea-based platforms provides operational mobility and enhances survivability by allowing vessels to reposition around the Japanese archipelago or operate within allied formations. The ASEV platform is larger than standard destroyer classes, measuring approximately 190 meters in length with a standard displacement of about 12,000 tons. Two vessels are currently under contract. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries is constructing the first ship, with commissioning scheduled for 2027. Japan Marine United is building the second vessel, planned for commissioning in 2028. The ships will integrate the Aegis Combat System, responsible for sensor fusion, threat evaluation, and weapon assignment. In combination with SPY-7, the system will support layered missile defense operations employing Standard Missile interceptors, including the SM-3 and SM-6 variants.   Industrial and Policy Context Fujitsu’s entry into the SPY-7 supply chain supports initial ship outfitting, long-term maintenance cycles, and potential future modernization pathways. The modular architecture of SPY-7 allows incremental upgrades through software enhancements and hardware replacements, extending operational lifespan without full system redesign. The co-production model aligns with Japan’s broader defense policy adjustments, including revisions to export control frameworks, increases in defense spending, and expanded technological cooperation with the United States and Indo-Pacific partners. Establishing domestic production for advanced radar components strengthens Japan’s defense industrial base, reduces reliance on overseas supply chains, and supports national technological self-reliance within its missile defense architecture.

Read More → Posted on 2026-02-16 13:33:43

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SOFIA, Bulgaria / TAUFKIRCHEN, Germany : German defense technology company Hensoldt and Bulgarian unmanned aircraft manufacturer Dronamics on Wednesday announced a strategic partnership to develop and produce a fully European unmanned airborne early warning and surveillance platform. The new system, named Dronamics Detect & Defend, integrates Dronamics’ long-range Black Swan unmanned aircraft with Hensoldt’s advanced mission sensor technologies. The companies describe the platform as a “100 percent made in Europe” solution designed to strengthen sovereign airspace monitoring and multi-domain threat detection capabilities.   Platform Overview The Detect & Defend system is configured as a Strategic NATO Class III Unmanned Aerial System (UAS). It is intended to provide Airborne Early Warning (AEW) and Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities across air, land and maritime domains. According to the companies, the platform is designed to address national security capability gaps by enabling persistent monitoring, detection and targeting of multi-domain threats. The system architecture supports continuous operations and multi-mission deployment within a single sortie.   Airframe: Black Swan UAV The aerial component of the platform is based on Dronamics’ Black Swan UAV, originally engineered for long-range cargo logistics and civil protection operations. Key specifications include: Endurance: More than 24 hours of continuous flight Range: 2,500 kilometers Payload Capacity: Up to 350 kilograms Wingspan: 16 meters Fuselage Length: 8 meters Maximum Operating Altitude: Up to 9,100 meters Cruising Speed: Approximately 200 kilometers per hour The aircraft’s endurance and payload capacity allow integration of multiple surveillance and sensor systems. The platform is configured for heavy-lift, long-range operations while maintaining operational flexibility. Dronamics, recognized as Europe’s first licensed cargo drone airline, developed the Black Swan initially for commercial logistics missions. The company is co-funded by the European Union under the European Innovation Council programme and is expanding into the defense sector through this collaboration.   Sensor and Mission Systems: MissionGrid Suite Hensoldt provides the sensor integration and mission systems under its MissionGrid architecture, converting the cargo-configured UAV into a multi-mission surveillance platform. The payload suite includes: PrecISR Radar System A compact Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) airborne multi-mission surveillance radar Designed for 24-hour operation All-weather operational capability Multi-domain surveillance performance MissMarvin Mission Management Software Integrated mission control and management system Works alongside onboard data fusion tools Enables coordinated use of multiple sensor inputs The scalable system architecture supports integration of radar and electro-optical sensors, allowing a single aircraft to execute multiple ISTAR roles during one deployment cycle. Hensoldt specializes in sensor solutions for defense and security applications across air, sea, land and cyber domains and continues investment in software-defined defense architectures to enhance interoperability and system flexibility.   Deployment Focus and Demonstration Timeline Initial demonstrations of the joint solution are scheduled to take place later in 2026. Following successful demonstrations, operational deployment is expected to prioritize regions identified as critical to European security, including: Europe’s Eastern Flank The Mediterranean Sea The Atlantic Ocean The companies state that the system is intended to address coverage gaps in national and regional airspace monitoring, supporting NATO-aligned security requirements.   Executive Statements Dietmar Thelen, Member of Hensoldt’s Group Executive Committee and Head of the Multi-Domain Solutions Division, said the partnership focuses on delivering integrated airborne solutions to close operational capability gaps and enhance European security, particularly along the Eastern Flank. He noted that the project reflects progress in software-defined defense development. Svilen Rangelov, Co-Founder and Chief Executive Officer of Dronamics, stated that the Detect & Defend system builds on the company’s tested drone platform. He emphasized the aircraft’s endurance exceeding 24 hours and its payload integration flexibility as key enablers for advanced defense applications, and highlighted collaboration with Hensoldt to leverage European aerospace technologies.   Strategic Significance The Detect & Defend platform represents a joint initiative to deliver a fully European-built airborne early warning and surveillance system at a time when European states are increasing investment in sovereign defense capabilities. By combining long-endurance unmanned flight, AESA radar technology, and integrated mission software, the system is positioned to provide persistent airborne surveillance coverage across multiple operational theaters without reliance on non-European suppliers. Demonstration activities later this year will determine the timeline for operational fielding and potential procurement by European defense customers.

Read More → Posted on 2026-02-16 13:14:55

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THE HAGUE : Dutch State Secretary for Defence Gijs Tuinman has stated that European operators of the F-35 Lightning II possess the technical capability to ensure operational independence from the United States if required, as part of a broader discussion on European defense readiness and long-term strategic autonomy. Speaking in a recent interview with BNR Podcasts, Tuinman addressed concerns regarding the reliance of European F-35 fleets on US-managed software systems. During the exchange, he indicated that the aircraft’s software architecture could theoretically be bypassed, comparing the process to “jailbreaking” a consumer device. “I’m going to say something I should never say, but I’ll do it anyway,” Tuinman said. “Just like your iPhone, you can jailbreak an F-35. I won’t say more about it.” When asked whether European operators could modify the aircraft’s systems without US approval, Tuinman responded, “That’s not the point… we’ll see whether the Americans will show their true colors.” His remarks were delivered in the context of Europe’s stated objective to achieve greater military self-reliance by the end of 2028, including the ability to defend itself without direct US assistance.   The Software Architecture Behind the F-35 The F-35 Lightning II, developed by Lockheed Martin, differs from earlier-generation combat aircraft in its extensive reliance on centralized digital infrastructure and software integration. European operators — including the Netherlands — depend on several US-managed systems that support maintenance, logistics, and mission functionality. One key element is the Operational Data Integrated Network (ODIN), which replaced the earlier Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS). ODIN is designed to monitor aircraft health, track component degradation, manage maintenance schedules, and transmit operational data to centralized servers. The system supports predictive maintenance and fleet readiness management across participating nations. The aircraft also relies on Mission Data Files (MDFs), which are essential to its sensor and electronic warfare capabilities. MDFs contain detailed threat libraries that allow the F-35 to identify and classify radar systems, missile batteries, and aircraft signatures. These files are compiled, validated, and updated through US-led processes before distribution to partner nations. Additionally, the F-35 operates within encrypted NATO communications frameworks, including Link-16 and other secure networks. Access to certain advanced weapons systems and secure communications requires cryptographic keys and authorization protocols managed within alliance structures. Because of this architecture, defense analysts have long discussed whether the United States retains indirect leverage over foreign-operated F-35 fleets. While there is no publicly confirmed mechanism that allows the US to remotely disable an aircraft in flight, limitations on software updates, maintenance system access, mission data updates, or cryptographic support could gradually affect operational readiness.   Implications of the “Jailbreaking” Reference In technology terms, “jailbreaking” refers to bypassing manufacturer-imposed software restrictions to gain greater system control. Applied to the F-35 context, Tuinman’s analogy suggests that European technicians could potentially develop technical workarounds to reduce or eliminate dependencies on US-controlled software elements if political circumstances required it. The Dutch Ministry of Defence has not provided technical details on what specific systems could be modified or how such changes would be implemented. It remains unclear whether Tuinman was referring to a theoretical capability, contingency planning, or an existing technical pathway. Neither Lockheed Martin nor the US Department of Defense has issued public responses to the remarks.   European Strategic Autonomy and the 2028 Objective Tuinman’s comments align with broader discussions across European capitals about strengthening defense sovereignty. Several European governments have increased defense spending and expanded industrial cooperation in response to evolving security dynamics. The Netherlands, as an F-35 partner nation, has invested significantly in the aircraft program and operates the jet as the backbone of its air force. Ensuring unrestricted operational control over such a core capability is central to any credible timeline for European defense autonomy. Tuinman stated that Europe aims to be capable of defending itself independently by late 2028. Achieving that objective would require secure access to logistics networks, mission data updates, munitions integration, and communications systems without vulnerability to external political decisions. His remarks reflect ongoing discussions within Europe regarding the long-term structure of transatlantic security arrangements. By indicating that software workarounds may exist, Tuinman highlighted that European governments are examining contingency measures while continuing to operate within established alliance frameworks.   No Immediate Policy Changes Announced Despite the attention generated by the comments, there has been no indication of immediate operational changes to Dutch or European F-35 fleets. The Netherlands remains a NATO member and a close defense partner of the United States. The Dutch Ministry of Defence has not announced plans to modify aircraft software, alter participation in US-managed support systems, or pursue independent mission data development outside existing agreements. At present, European F-35 operators continue to rely on established maintenance, software, and mission data frameworks coordinated through the multinational F-35 program office and US defense infrastructure.

Read More → Posted on 2026-02-15 18:08:00

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U.S. Military Boards Sanctioned Oil Tanker Veronica III in Indian Ocean WASHINGTON : U.S. military forces have intercepted and boarded the oil tanker Veronica III in the Indian Ocean after tracking the vessel from the Caribbean Sea, the Pentagon confirmed on Sunday, February 15, 2026. The operation is part of ongoing U.S. actions to enforce international sanctions against illicit oil shipments linked with Venezuela and other sanctioned networks.   Tracking and Interdiction Effort According to the U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. forces monitored Veronica III beginning in the Caribbean, where the tanker departed Venezuelan waters on January 3, 2026, with a large cargo of crude and fuel oil. The vessel was located and boarded overnight within the operational area of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). Officials described the action as a “right-of-visit, maritime interdiction and boarding”, carried out without incident. The Pentagon also released video footage showing U.S. personnel boarding the tanker at sea, including via helicopter deployment. In a public post on the social media platform X, the Defense Department stated that the Veronica III “tried to defy President Trump’s quarantine,” referencing a directive issued by the U.S. in December 2025 to enforce maritime restrictions on sanctioned vessels.   Vessel Profile and Cargo The Veronica III is a large oil tanker registered under the Panamanian flag and is listed on the U.S. Treasury Department’s sanctions list for its involvement in transporting petroleum believed to violate U.S. sanctions regimes. Analysts and maritime tracking data indicate that the vessel was transporting an estimated 1.9 million to 2 million barrels of crude and fuel oil when intercepted. The tanker’s movements and past cargoes have been associated with supply networks involving Venezuelan, Iranian, and Russian oil, part of what maritime analysts call a “shadow fleet” that frequently alters flags and tracking information to evade detection.   Context of Enforcement Activity The boarding of Veronica III is aligned with broader U.S. strategies to disrupt sanctioned oil flows. In December 2025, the U.S. government ordered a maritime quarantine targeting sanctioned tankers as part of efforts to strengthen enforcement against illicit oil exports. Earlier in January 2026, U.S. forces conducted Operation Southern Spear, a military action that included the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. Defense officials noted that Veronica III was among several tankers that departed Venezuelan waters on the same day as Maduro’s apprehension. Last week, U.S. forces also intercepted another sanctioned oil tanker, Aquila II, in the Indian Ocean under similar circumstances. That vessel remains held as U.S. authorities determine its legal and logistical disposition.   Legal and International Response Officials have not announced whether Veronica III will be formally seized or placed under U.S. control following the boarding. The Department of Defense stated the operation adhered to international maritime protocols and that it was executed without resistance from the vessel’s crew. The enforcement of sanctions against oil shipments continues to draw attention from other governments and international maritime stakeholders, some of whom have differing interpretations of the legal and diplomatic implications of such interceptions in international waters.

Read More → Posted on 2026-02-15 17:48:26

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PARIS : The French Army is assessing foreign multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) as a temporary solution to sustain long-range artillery capabilities until its domestically developed FLP-T (Frappe Longue Portée – Terrestre) system enters service in 2030. Among the systems under evaluation are South Korea’s K239 Chunmoo and India’s Pinaka, alongside previously examined options such as the American M142 HIMARS and Israel’s PULS. The move follows concerns over the limited availability and aging condition of France’s current LRU fleet, the French designation for the M270 tracked rocket launcher.   Addressing the Capability Gap French artillery units currently operate a reduced number of LRU (M270) systems, which require extensive maintenance and are increasingly constrained in meeting the demands of high-intensity operations. Defense outlet Opex360 has reported that the aging fleet presents both availability and sustainability challenges. To prevent a decline in operational readiness before the FLP-T becomes available, the Ministry of Armed Forces has examined off-the-shelf foreign systems capable of rapid induction. A study by the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) recommended South Korea’s K239 Chunmoo, produced by Hanwha Aerospace, as a suitable interim option. The Chunmoo integrates rocket launch modules similar in concept to the M270 but mounted on a wheeled chassis, providing enhanced road mobility and simplified logistics compared to tracked systems. The IFRI assessment highlighted several factors in favor of the Chunmoo: Multi-caliber capability allowing the firing of different types of rockets and missiles Operational flexibility for varied mission profiles Shorter delivery timelines compared to developing a new domestic system The K239 is already in service or on order with several European countries, including Norway, Estonia, and Poland. Poland has also initiated domestic ammunition production linked to its Chunmoo acquisition, contributing to the development of a European supply chain for compatible munitions. In parallel, France is evaluating India’s Pinaka MLRS as another potential interim system. The Pinaka, developed and produced in India, has undergone successive upgrades and is designed to deliver high-volume rocket fire with modular launcher configurations. It is being considered as a bridging solution pending the operational availability of France’s indigenous program.   Long-Term Objective: The FLP-T Program Despite the review of foreign platforms, France’s long-term strategy remains centered on sovereign industrial capability under the 2024–2030 Military Programming Law (LPM). The FLP-T program is mandated to replace the M270 LRU with a domestically developed long-range strike system. According to program targets, the FLP-T must initially achieve a strike range exceeding 150 kilometers at the time of delivery in 2030. A subsequent phased enhancement is planned to extend operational reach to between 500 and 1,000 kilometers. Two industrial consortiums are currently engaged in parallel development efforts for the FLP-T contract: Safran and MBDA Thales and ArianeGroup The French government is expected to select the winning industrial team in 2026.   Competing Domestic Proposals French defense companies have already introduced candidate systems aligned with FLP-T requirements. In April 2025, at the defense exhibition in Le Bourget, a domestically developed MLRS named Foudre was publicly unveiled. Positioned in the same operational category as the U.S. HIMARS, Foudre has been presented as a fully French-made solution designed to meet national operational requirements. In October 2025, the MBDA–Safran consortium formally introduced the Thundart MLRS. The system has been developed specifically to compete for the French Army’s upcoming tender and is structured to comply with the initial range objectives of the FLP-T program. The consortium has emphasized European supply chain autonomy as a core component of its proposal.   Industrial and Strategic Considerations France’s evaluation of interim foreign systems reflects a dual-track approach: maintaining near-term operational readiness while advancing long-term industrial sovereignty. The interim procurement, if approved, would serve as a temporary capability bridge until domestic serial production under the FLP-T program begins. At the same time, the 2024–2030 LPM framework reinforces France’s objective of ensuring strategic autonomy in long-range ground-based strike systems. A final decision on interim acquisitions has not yet been publicly announced. The selection of the FLP-T prime contractor is expected in 2026, with system induction planned for 2030.

Read More → Posted on 2026-02-15 17:41:03

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WASHINGTON : The U.S. Air Force is moving forward with development of the Next Generation Penetrator (NGP), a new hard-target defeat weapon intended to replace the GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP). The decision follows operational use of the 30,000-pound GBU-57 earlier this year and reflects updated requirements tied to future bomber platforms and evolving electronic warfare conditions. The program is being managed by the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC), which has awarded a two-year contract to Applied Research Associates (ARA), headquartered in New Mexico, to lead overall system design, prototyping and testing. Boeing, the original manufacturer of the GBU-57, is partnering on development of the tail kit assembly and will support integration of the complete munition configuration.   Operational Context and Program Acceleration The Department of Defense began examining concepts for a successor to the GBU-57 more than a decade ago. However, the requirement gained urgency following “Operation Midnight Hammer” (June 2025), during which U.S. Air Force B-2 Spirit bombers conducted strikes against deeply buried Iranian nuclear facilities at Fordow and Natanz. During that operation, 14 GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrators were employed against hardened underground targets. Post-strike assessments identified operational constraints associated with the weapon’s size and platform compatibility. The GBU-57, weighing approximately 30,000 pounds, can only be carried by the B-2 Spirit and is limited to two weapons per sortie. In cases involving heavily reinforced structures, multiple munitions were required to be delivered sequentially into the same impact point to achieve the intended structural damage. The NGP program is structured to address these constraints by reducing weapon weight, improving precision, and expanding compatibility with future bomber platforms.   Weight Reduction and Platform Integration Procurement documentation specifies that the NGP warhead must weigh 22,000 pounds or less, representing a reduction of roughly one-third compared to the GBU-57. The size and weight limits are aligned with integration requirements for the B-21 Raider stealth bomber, which is expected to carry one NGP per mission under current planning assumptions. The reduced form factor is also intended to allow potential integration with additional platforms as future force structure evolves. While the GBU-57 is exclusive to the B-2 fleet, the NGP is being designed with broader compatibility considerations, subject to certification and testing.   Guidance and Accuracy in Contested Environments The NGP will incorporate advanced guidance and navigation systems designed to operate effectively in GPS-degraded or denied environments. The requirement reflects operational lessons from recent conflicts involving electronic interference and satellite navigation disruption. The Air Force has specified a terminal Circular Error Probable (CEP) of 2.2 meters (7.2 feet) or less, ensuring high accuracy even under contested conditions. The guidance architecture is expected to reduce reliance on standard GPS signals, though specific subsystem configurations have not been publicly disclosed.   Smart Fuzing and Penetration Enhancements A key feature of the NGP will be the integration of “void-counting” smart fuzes. These embedded sensors are designed to detect internal cavities or hollow spaces within rock, reinforced concrete, or underground structures. By measuring density changes during penetration, the fuze system can determine the optimal detonation depth to maximize internal structural damage. The munition is required to deliver a combination of blast, fragmentation, and specialized penetration effects. The design objective is to enhance effectiveness against Hard and Deeply Buried Targets (HDBT), including facilities protected by reinforced concrete, steel structures, and natural rock overburden.   Propulsion and Stand-Off Capability Unlike the unpowered GBU-57, which relies on gravity and release altitude to generate kinetic energy, contracting documents indicate that the NGP may incorporate a rocket motor or booster. If implemented, this propulsion system would provide stand-off strike capability, enabling bomber aircraft to release the weapon from greater distances outside advanced air defense coverage. Increased impact velocity from a booster could also improve penetration depth prior to detonation.   Development Timeline and Budget For fiscal year 2026, the Air Force has requested $73.7 million to support research and development activities for the NGP program. Funding will cover ground-based sub-scale testing, full-scale static testing, engineering refinement, and prototype validation. Under the current contract, Applied Research Associates (ARA) and Boeing are tasked with delivering approximately 10 sub-scale prototypes and three to five full-scale test articles within an 18- to 24-month timeframe. The Air Force plans to conclude the prototype demonstration phase by the end of fiscal year 2027. If program milestones are achieved, the Next Generation Penetrator is expected to transition into production and ultimately replace the concluding GBU-57 production line, maintaining U.S. capability to engage hardened and deeply buried targets while aligning with next-generation bomber requirements.

Read More → Posted on 2026-02-15 17:11:58

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WASHINGTON : The U.S. Air Force has initiated a sole-source procurement with Boeing valued at more than $100 million to replenish its inventory of GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrators (MOPs), following their use during U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025. Recently released, partially redacted Justification and Approval (J&A) documents confirm the acquisition is intended to restore operational readiness within Air Force Global Strike Command. The procurement is specifically designated to replace GBU-57 munitions expended during U.S. military operations conducted on the night of June 21–22, 2025, under the codename Operation Midnight Hammer. Defense officials indicated in the documents that replenishing the stockpile is “critically needed” to maintain the Air Force’s capability against deeply buried and hardened targets.   Limited Stockpile and Sole-Source Selection The GBU-57 is the U.S. military’s largest conventional bunker-buster bomb, weighing approximately 30,000 pounds. Due to its specialized role and high classification level, production quantities have historically been limited. Public estimates suggested that by the mid-2010s roughly 20 units had been delivered to Whiteman Air Force Base, home to the B-2 Spirit stealth bomber fleet. The precise pre-2025 inventory remains classified. The June 2025 strikes consumed a significant portion of the available stockpile, prompting the Air Force to move forward with an urgent replenishment contract. Boeing was selected on a sole-source basis, with procurement officials stating that introducing an additional vendor would result in unacceptable delays due to the technical complexity and specialized manufacturing requirements of the weapon system. The contract covers production of MOP All-Up-Round (AUR) hardware as well as associated precision guidance tail kits. According to procurement timelines, delivery will require several years. The first new tail kits are projected to begin arriving on January 10, 2028. The extended lead time reflects the complexity of manufacturing and integrating components for the high-mass penetrator system.   Operational Context: Operation Midnight Hammer The expenditure of GBU-57 munitions occurred during Operation Midnight Hammer, a coordinated U.S. strike targeting fortified Iranian nuclear infrastructure. According to official accounts, seven B-2 Spirit stealth bombers participated in the mission. During the operation, a total of 14 GBU-57 MOPs were deployed against two primary uranium enrichment sites: Fordow and Natanz. The Fordow facility, constructed deep beneath a mountain, was assessed as requiring the use of the GBU-57 due to its hardened and deeply buried structure. The weapon is designed to penetrate up to approximately 200 feet of earth and reinforced concrete before detonation, enabling it to engage targets protected by substantial overburden. The B-2 Spirit is currently the only operational aircraft capable of carrying and deploying the 30,000-pound GBU-57. Each aircraft can carry two MOPs per sortie due to payload and weapons bay constraints.   Conclusion of GBU-57 Production Procurement documents indicate that the current Boeing contract is expected to conclude production under the GBU-57 program. The Air Force has signaled that this replenishment round will likely be the final acquisition of the weapon as the service transitions to its successor system. The decision aligns with broader modernization efforts aimed at integrating next-generation munitions with emerging stealth aircraft platforms.   Development of the Next Generation Penetrator The GBU-57’s successor, designated the Next Generation Penetrator (NGP), is currently under development through a collaborative effort between Applied Research Associates (ARA) and Boeing. The NGP program is intended to address operational and physical limitations associated with the existing MOP. One primary objective is weight reduction. While the GBU-57 weighs approximately 30,000 pounds, the NGP is reportedly being engineered to weigh under 22,000 pounds. This reduction will allow compatibility with the weapons bay of the forthcoming B-21 Raider stealth bomber, expanding deployment options beyond the B-2 fleet. In addition to weight considerations, the NGP is being designed with upgraded smart fuzes and advanced guidance systems. Program requirements specify terminal accuracy within 2.2 meters, including performance in GPS-degraded or GPS-denied environments. These enhancements aim to improve precision while maintaining the capability to defeat deeply buried and hardened targets.   Strategic Implications By replenishing the remaining GBU-57 inventory while concluding its production line, the Air Force is maintaining near-term operational capacity against hardened targets. At the same time, development and integration of the Next Generation Penetrator are intended to align future deep-strike capabilities with the next generation of stealth aviation platforms. The current contract ensures continuity of capability for Air Force Global Strike Command until the NGP program reaches operational maturity.

Read More → Posted on 2026-02-15 17:01:43

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WASHINGTON — The U.S. Air Force has formally rejected reports claiming that newly manufactured F-35A Lightning II fighter aircraft are being delivered without onboard radar systems, stating that all Lot 17 aircraft continue to arrive with their standard AN/APG-81 radar systems installed. In a statement provided to The War Zone, an Air Force spokesperson said, “Lot 17 F-35A aircraft are being delivered to the U.S. Air Force with AN/APG-81 radars,” directly addressing allegations that surfaced in recent defense media coverage.   Report Alleged Radar Installation Issues The clarification follows a report by Defense Daily, which cited anonymous sources alleging that beginning in June 2025, F-35A fighters were being accepted without radar units due to development delays involving the next-generation AN/APG-85 radar. According to the report, delays in the AN/APG-85 program had affected transition plans for newer production lots. It further claimed that the legacy AN/APG-81 radar, produced by Northrop Grumman, could not be installed on Lot 17 airframes due to modifications in mounting configurations. The publication also alleged that, in the absence of radar systems, metal weight ballasts were being installed in the nose section of the aircraft to preserve proper weight distribution and center-of-gravity requirements. The claims gained attention across online defense forums and social media platforms, particularly after photographs circulated showing an F-35A with disc-shaped metal weights installed in the forward fuselage.   Air Force Identifies Aircraft as Training Platform The U.S. Air Force stated that the aircraft shown in the widely shared images is not a newly produced operational jet. Instead, officials confirmed that the aircraft is a retired F-35A airframe being used exclusively for ground-based recovery training. The photographs were taken during the first Course for Damaged Disabled Aircraft Recovery (CDDAR) conducted at Hill Air Force Base, Utah. The course focused on training maintenance and emergency response personnel in aircraft recovery operations under controlled conditions. According to Air Force officials, the airframe used in the training event is a decommissioned F-35A that sustained significant damage in a 2016 engine fire while assigned to Mountain Home Air Force Base. Following an assessment, repair costs were determined to be economically impractical, and the aircraft was formally written off. It was later repurposed as a dedicated training platform.   Assembly and Training Use Personnel from the 388th Maintenance Group, working in coordination with the F-35 Joint Program Office, reassembled the damaged aircraft over a three-week period using spare components stored in maintenance depots. The aircraft is not flight-capable and is not part of operational fleet deliveries. During a recent five-day CDDAR course at Hill Air Force Base, 29 technicians from the United States and allied partner nations participated in recovery training exercises using the retired airframe. Training activities included: Lifting the aircraft using a heavy-duty crane Performing recovery procedures simulating nose landing gear failure Conducting emergency pilot extraction drills To ensure accurate simulation of real-world handling conditions, maintenance teams installed precisely calculated metal weight ballasts in the aircraft’s nose section. Officials stated that the weights were designed to replicate the operational weight and center-of-gravity characteristics of a fully equipped F-35A during complex lifting and recovery operations.   No Impact on Operational Deliveries The Air Force emphasized that operational Lot 17 F-35A aircraft are being delivered with AN/APG-81 radar systems installed and that the training airframe depicted in the photographs is not representative of production aircraft. The AN/APG-81 active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar remains the standard sensor suite for current F-35A deliveries, while development of the AN/APG-85 radar continues under the broader modernization roadmap. Air Force officials stated that the circulating claims stemmed from a misinterpretation of training imagery and confirmed that no radar-less operational F-35A aircraft are being delivered to the service.

Read More → Posted on 2026-02-15 16:19:52

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MUNICH : Prime Minister Keir Starmer has said the United Kingdom should consider re-entering negotiations on a formal defence pact with the European Union, including potential participation in the EU’s Security Action for Europe (SAFE) defence fund. He stated that closer cooperation would serve the UK’s national security interests and strengthen Europe’s overall defence capability. Speaking following an overseas visit to China and later at the Munich Security Conference in mid-February 2026, Starmer indicated that his government is open to resuming discussions with Brussels under revised terms.   SAFE Fund Framework and Previous Negotiations The SAFE initiative is a €150 billion (£130 billion) loan programme established by the European Commission to support urgent and large-scale defence procurement projects across Europe. The scheme provides competitively priced, long-maturity loans aimed at accelerating joint military acquisitions and reinforcing the European defence industrial base. Although primarily designed for the 27 EU member states, the framework allows participation by third countries that maintain formal security agreements with the bloc. The UK entered negotiations in autumn 2025 to join the first iteration of the SAFE scheme. Talks ended in November 2025 after disagreements over financial entry requirements. EU officials reportedly requested contribution payments of up to £5.7 billion for participation rights. The UK government declined those terms. With the European Commission considering a second iteration of the SAFE programme, Starmer confirmed that the UK would examine participation if financial conditions align with national interests.   Strategic Rationale for Cooperation Starmer stated that Europe’s defence posture requires greater integration in response to current security challenges. Participation in multinational procurement frameworks would enable joint weapons acquisitions, reduce costs through economies of scale, and improve interoperability among European armed forces. He also referred to fragmentation within Europe’s defence industrial planning, noting duplication of capabilities and uneven investment patterns. A coordinated industrial base, he said, would increase production capacity and streamline procurement across participating countries. The renewed discussion on defence coordination comes amid the ongoing conflict involving Russia and Ukraine and stated uncertainty regarding long-term United States security commitments to NATO under President Donald Trump’s administration. Starmer said enhanced European cooperation would operate alongside existing transatlantic arrangements.   Defence Pact Discussions In addition to SAFE participation, Starmer said broader negotiations on a formal UK-EU defence pact should be reconsidered. Such a pact could establish frameworks for intelligence sharing, joint operations, procurement coordination, and defence industrial collaboration. Since Brexit, the UK and the EU have continued security cooperation primarily through NATO and bilateral channels. There is currently no comprehensive standalone defence agreement between London and Brussels. Starmer stated that cooperation could extend beyond EU member states to include other European countries where appropriate, focusing on shared security requirements.   Diplomatic Engagements and Next Steps Further discussions are expected in London, where EU officials, including Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič, are scheduled to meet UK counterparts. Defence cooperation and its connection to broader trade and industrial relations are expected to be discussed. Any renewed agreement would require negotiations on financial contributions, governance structures, procurement regulations, and eligibility criteria for UK defence firms participating in EU-funded projects. The European Commission has not formally announced detailed terms for the second edition of the SAFE fund. Consultations are ongoing within EU institutions and member states. The UK government has not set a timeline for reopening formal negotiations, though exploratory discussions are under consideration.

Read More → Posted on 2026-02-15 16:01:58

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ADELAIDE, South Australia : The Australian government has committed an initial AUD $3.9 billion (approximately USD $2.76 billion) to establish a dedicated nuclear-powered submarine construction yard at Osborne, South Australia. The investment forms part of Australia’s obligations under the AUKUS trilateral security partnership with the United States and the United Kingdom. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese described the allocation as an initial installment toward the broader development of the Submarine Construction Yard. According to Australian Naval Infrastructure (ANI), the government-owned entity responsible for delivering the project, the total cost of the facility is projected to reach approximately AUD $30 billion over the coming decades.   Scope of the Osborne Development The new facility will be constructed on a 75-hectare site located north of the existing Osborne Naval Shipyard. The site is currently used to support maintenance operations for the Royal Australian Navy’s Collins-class diesel-electric submarines. The expanded yard will serve as the primary production base for the SSN-AUKUS class of nuclear-powered submarines. Construction will involve collaboration between ASC (Australia) and BAE Systems (United Kingdom). The submarines will be built in Australia following the acquisition of US-built Virginia-class submarines in the early 2030s. Key infrastructure specifications released by the government and ANI include: A fabrication hall measuring approximately 420 meters in length. Use of around 710,000 cubic meters of structural concrete. Use of approximately 126,000 tonnes of structural steel. Division of the yard into three primary operational zones: fabrication, outfitting, and a controlled nuclear precinct. The nuclear precinct will be designed for consolidation, systems testing, launch preparation, and commissioning activities. The development will require significant enabling works, including relocation of utilities, ground preparation, and construction of new access roads. These preparatory works are already underway.   Integration with the AUKUS Program The shipyard forms part of the broader AUKUS agreement, announced in 2021, under which Australia will transition to operating nuclear-powered, conventionally armed submarines. The framework includes several stages. In the near term, Australia will host rotational deployments of United States and United Kingdom nuclear-powered submarines. Beginning in the early 2030s, Australia is scheduled to acquire up to three US Virginia-class submarines. Following this interim capability, Australia will transition to domestic production of the SSN-AUKUS class at Osborne. The SSN-AUKUS design will be based on a United Kingdom platform and incorporate United States technologies, including vertical launch systems and propulsion-related components. As a non-nuclear-weapon state, Australia will not manufacture nuclear fuel. Instead, complete, welded nuclear propulsion units will be supplied by the United States and the United Kingdom.   Industrial and Workforce Planning The federal and South Australian governments have outlined workforce projections linked to both the construction phase and ongoing submarine production. During construction of the Osborne Submarine Construction Yard, approximately 4,000 workers are expected to be employed in design and building activities. Once the facility becomes operational and submarine production reaches peak levels, employment is projected to rise to approximately 5,500 workers. To support long-term workforce requirements, the government has committed an additional AUD $500 million to establish an on-site Skills and Training Academy. The academy is expected to train up to 1,000 apprentices annually to support Australia’s continuous naval shipbuilding program.   Long-Term Infrastructure Development Australian Naval Infrastructure has indicated that the development represents one of the largest expansions of Australia’s defense industrial base. The scale of the planned construction, including large-volume concrete and steel requirements, reflects the specialized standards necessary for nuclear-powered submarine production. The Osborne facility will operate alongside existing naval shipbuilding operations and will form part of Australia’s long-term strategy to establish a sovereign nuclear submarine construction capability under the AUKUS partnership. The initial AUD $3.9 billion allocation marks the first stage of funding for what is projected to be a multi-decade infrastructure program supporting Australia’s transition to nuclear-powered submarine operations.

Read More → Posted on 2026-02-15 15:32:16

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NEW ORLEANS, Louisian : Damen Shipyards Group, based in the Netherlands, has signed a strategic licensing agreement with Boston-based maritime technology firm Blue Water Autonomy to construct the U.S. Navy’s first “Liberty Class” autonomous surface vessel, marking a structured step toward scalable, unmanned maritime operations. Under the agreement, Damen will license its proven Stan Patrol 6009 platform for adaptation into a 60-meter steel-hulled autonomous vessel. Construction of the first ship is scheduled to begin in March 2026 at Conrad Shipyard in Louisiana. The vessel is expected to be delivered to the U.S. Navy later in 2026 under a formal programme of record focused on integrating unmanned systems alongside traditional crewed fleets.   Design Framework and Platform Selection The Liberty Class has been jointly designed by Damen Shipyards Group and Blue Water Autonomy, drawing from the existing Damen Stan Patrol 6009 hull form. The use of a commercially proven patrol platform is intended to reduce development timelines and enable production scalability using established industrial infrastructure. Damen’s role includes licensing the design and supporting adaptation of the hull for autonomous operations. Blue Water Autonomy is responsible for re-engineering core ship systems to enable long-duration unmanned deployment. Mark Honders, Design and Licence Manager at Damen, said the adaptation of the Stan Patrol 6009 demonstrates how commercial ship designs can be modified to support emerging maritime mission requirements.   Technical Specifications and Operational Profile The Liberty Class autonomous vessel is configured for extended, independent missions in open-ocean conditions. According to project specifications, the vessel will feature: Length: 60 meters Operational Range: Over 10,000 nautical miles Payload Capacity: More than 150 tonnes Cargo Configuration: Capability to carry four 40-foot containers Mission Compatibility: Integration of missile systems, advanced sensor packages, and logistics modules Endurance: Designed for deployments lasting several months without onboard crew The vessel’s internal architecture has been significantly modified to enable full autonomous operation. Blue Water Autonomy redesigned the internal layout, including a complete reconfiguration of the engine room. Fault-tolerant propulsion systems have been incorporated to allow continued operation in the event of component failures. Mechanical and electrical systems are engineered to maintain automated control during long transoceanic deployments, reducing the need for human intervention. The objective is to support sustained naval operations without requiring a permanently embarked crew. Rylan Hamilton, Chief Executive Officer of Blue Water Autonomy, stated that adapting an existing hull while re-engineering internal systems enables extended crewless operations while aligning with Navy production timelines.   Axe Bow Hull Technology A central structural feature of the Liberty Class is Damen’s patented “Axe Bow” hull design, developed in collaboration with Delft University of Technology in the Netherlands. The Axe Bow features a vertical stem engineered to cut through waves rather than ride over them. The design reduces hull slamming—impact forces generated when the hull re-enters the water after pitching in heavy seas—and improves wave re-entry performance. More than 300 vessels worldwide currently utilize the Axe Bow configuration. Damen Shipyards Group holds exclusive patent rights. Licensing revenues from the technology are reinvested into maritime research through the Collaborative Axe Bow Fund at Delft University of Technology.   Production Plan and Industrial Capacity The Liberty Class vessels will be constructed at Conrad Shipyard in Louisiana. The shipyard operates five facilities and employs approximately 1,100 workers. It utilizes automated panel production lines and advanced welding processes to support serial ship construction. Conrad Shipyard currently produces more than 30 vessels annually across multiple categories. According to company leadership, existing infrastructure is capable of supporting scaled production of the Liberty Class following initial delivery. Cecil Hernandez, President and CEO of Conrad Shipyard, indicated that the facility is prepared for serial production once the first vessel is completed and validated. Blue Water Autonomy has outlined a production target of 10 to 20 vessels per year after the initial unit enters service, depending on U.S. Navy procurement decisions and programme requirements.   Programme Structure and Naval Integration The Liberty Class is being developed under a formal U.S. Navy programme of record, aligning with broader naval modernization efforts focused on integrating unmanned surface vessels (USVs) into fleet operations. The vessels are intended to complement crewed warships by providing distributed maritime capability, including missile deployment, sensor operations, and logistics support. The approach leverages commercial shipbuilding supply chains and established yard capacity to accelerate production timelines.   Historical Reference: Liberty Class Designation The designation “Liberty Class” references the Liberty Ships of World War II, which were mass-produced using standardized designs and commercial shipyard infrastructure to meet national security requirements. The modern Liberty Class follows a similar production model, utilizing an existing hull design and domestic shipbuilding capacity to deliver scalable operational capability. Construction of the first unit is scheduled to begin in March 2026, with delivery planned later in the year, marking the initial phase of the Navy’s expansion of autonomous maritime platforms.

Read More → Posted on 2026-02-15 14:25:57

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PARIS : The Dassault Rafale combat aircraft is entering a new phase of capability development as France advances work on the Rafale F5 standard, centered on the introduction of the Gallium Nitride-based RBE2-XG active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar. As of February 2026, the program has moved beyond initial design stages and is progressing through hardware prototyping and ground validation, with flight trials scheduled later in the decade. The RBE2-XG radar is being developed by Thales under contract from France’s Direction générale de l’armement (DGA). It represents an evolution of the existing RBE2-AA AESA radar currently fielded on Rafale F3-R and F4 aircraft.   Transition from Gallium Arsenide to Gallium Nitride The current RBE2-AA radar uses Gallium Arsenide (GaAs) transmit/receive modules. While GaAs-based AESA systems have delivered reliable multirole performance, power density and thermal constraints limit further performance growth within the same material architecture. The RBE2-XG replaces GaAs with Gallium Nitride (GaN) semiconductor technology. GaN modules are capable of operating at higher voltages and temperatures, enabling increased power output and improved energy efficiency. According to program estimates, the shift to GaN could extend radar detection ranges by approximately 30% to 70%, depending on target characteristics and engagement conditions. GaN technology also allows improved thermal management. Higher efficiency per watt reduces cooling demands while permitting greater transmitted power. This enables a more capable radar array without exceeding the aircraft’s environmental control system limits. In addition to extended range, the wider frequency agility and higher power output of the RBE2-XG are intended to improve detection and tracking performance against low-observable aircraft, including platforms such as the Chengdu J-20 and the Sukhoi Su-57. Enhanced resistance to electronic jamming and improved signal processing are also central design objectives.   Development Status as of February 2026 The RBE2-XG program formally entered Phase 1 development in June 2023 following notification of the initial contract by the DGA. In late 2024, France’s Ministry of Armed Forces announced the official launch of the Rafale F5 standard, which incorporates the extended-generation radar as a core component. In the third quarter of 2024, Thales received notification for the second tranche of development. This phase focuses on detailed design, hardware prototyping, and preparation for system integration. Throughout 2025 and into early 2026, prototype GaN arrays have been undergoing validation in ground-based test facilities, including anechoic chamber trials. Testing is aimed at verifying high-power output performance, electronic counter-countermeasure resistance, and overall reliability under operational stress conditions. Parallel to radar development, the Rafale F5 configuration is receiving upgrades to its internal architecture. A new fiber-optic cabling backbone is being introduced to manage increased data throughput generated by the RBE2-XG and other upgraded onboard systems. The revised digital infrastructure is designed to support higher bandwidth sensor fusion and future software-driven enhancements.   Industrial Participation and India’s Role In December 2025, Thales awarded a contract to SFO Technologies, based in Kochi, India, for the production of complex wired structures associated with the RBE2 radar family. The agreement supports the broader Rafale industrial ecosystem and aligns with India’s acquisition of 26 Rafale Marine aircraft for the Indian Navy. The localization of certain radar-related manufacturing activities positions India as a production partner within the Rafale supply chain, rather than solely as an end user. While the current contract concerns RBE2 radar components, the industrial base established through such partnerships may be relevant as the radar architecture evolves toward the XG standard in future upgrades.   Roadmap to Operational Service The RBE2-XG and Rafale F5 development schedule follows a phased roadmap extending to the end of the decade: June 2023: Phase 1 development contract notification by DGA. October 2024: Official launch of the Rafale F5 standard by the French Minister of Armed Forces. Third Quarter 2024: Notification of Phase 2 (detailed design and prototyping). 2025–2026: Ground-based validation of GaN modules and integration testing (current stage). 2027: Acceleration of F5-related technological elements as referenced in French defense budget planning. 2028: Planned first flight trials of the RBE2-XG on a flying testbed. 2030 and beyond: Targeted entry into operational service on Rafale F5 aircraft. Flight trials will validate airborne performance, electromagnetic compatibility, and integration with other onboard systems before full fleet deployment.   Integration with Broader F5 Capabilities The RBE2-XG radar is one element of the broader Rafale F5 modernization package. The upgraded aircraft is designed to support expanded collaborative combat functions, including control of unmanned combat aerial vehicles derived from the nEUROn program. The enhanced radar processing capacity, combined with updates to mission computers and data links, is intended to improve sensor fusion between the RBE2-XG, the SPECTRA electronic warfare suite, and the Front Sector Optronics (FSO) system. The objective is to deliver a consolidated tactical picture for the pilot while enabling coordinated operations with manned and unmanned assets. By integrating higher-power GaN radar technology, upgraded digital architecture, and expanded network capabilities, the Rafale F5 standard is structured to maintain operational relevance into the 2040s. The RBE2-XG radar forms the central sensor upgrade underpinning this long-term modernization strategy.

Read More → Posted on 2026-02-15 14:11:40

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BARKSDALE AIR FORCE BASE, La., : Air Force Global Strike Command confirmed it retains the technical capability to reconfigure the U.S. land-based intercontinental ballistic missile force to carry multiple nuclear warheads, following the expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) on Feb. 5, 2026. The confirmation indicates that the U.S. Air Force is prepared, pending direction from the U.S. government, to restore Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) configurations on the LGM-30G Minuteman III fleet. The move would mark a return to a posture that has not been operationally employed for more than a decade.   Treaty Context and Expiration New START, signed in 2010 by the United States and Russia, entered into force in 2011 and was extended once, remaining in effect until Feb. 5, 2026. The agreement limited each country to 1,550 deployed strategic warheads and 700 deployed strategic delivery systems, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers. Under the treaty’s implementation, the United States maintained its 400 deployed Minuteman III ICBMs in a “de-MIRVed” configuration, restricting each missile to a single nuclear warhead. The transition to single-warhead deployment began in 2001 and was completed in 2014 to align with treaty requirements and broader strategic stability objectives. With the treaty’s expiration, there are no longer legally binding caps on deployed strategic warheads or launchers between the two countries.   Technical Basis of the MIRV Capability The Minuteman III, first deployed in 1970, was the world’s first operational ICBM equipped with MIRV technology. The system was originally designed to carry up to three independently targetable reentry vehicles mounted on a post-boost vehicle, commonly referred to as the “bus.” The bus allows warheads to be released sequentially along different trajectories, enabling a single missile to strike multiple geographically separated targets. Although the missiles were reconfigured to carry a single warhead under arms control commitments, the core architecture — including guidance systems and post-boost vehicles — remains compatible with multi-warhead configurations. According to AFGSC, the technical expertise, maintenance procedures, and infrastructure required to support a MIRVed configuration have been preserved. Any decision to re-MIRV the force would require policy direction, warhead allocation decisions, and potential adjustments to operational planning.   Strategic Force Structure and Warhead Capacity The United States currently deploys 400 Minuteman III missiles across three missile wings: F.E. Warren Air Force Base Malmstrom Air Force Base Minot Air Force Base Each missile is presently configured with a single warhead. Restoring the original MIRV capacity of up to three warheads per missile would increase the potential number of ICBM-delivered warheads from approximately 400 to as many as 1,200, assuming sufficient warhead inventory and policy authorization. Such a shift would not require additional missiles or new silos, as it would rely on existing launch infrastructure. However, it would alter the distribution of warheads within the U.S. nuclear triad, which also includes ballistic missile submarines and strategic bombers.   Operational Considerations From a military planning perspective, deploying multiple warheads per missile increases the number of aimpoints covered by the land-based deterrent. Each reentry vehicle can be assigned a distinct target, expanding the range of potential strike options without increasing launcher numbers. In terms of missile defense, MIRVed systems present additional complexity for interceptors. Anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems are typically designed to engage individual incoming reentry vehicles. Multiple warheads from a single booster increase the number of objects that must be tracked and potentially intercepted. Supporters of MIRV configurations state that such a posture strengthens second-strike capability, ensuring that even a reduced number of surviving missiles could deliver multiple warheads against separate targets. Critics in previous arms control discussions have noted that MIRVed land-based missiles concentrate multiple warheads in a single silo, which could influence strategic stability calculations during a crisis.   Transition to the Sentinel Program The Minuteman III remains the sole land-based leg of the U.S. nuclear triad and has undergone successive life-extension programs to maintain operational viability. The Department of Defense is developing the LGM-35A Sentinel to replace the Minuteman III beginning in the early 2030s. Until the Sentinel reaches initial operational capability, the existing Minuteman III force will continue to provide the land-based strategic deterrent. Any decision to re-equip the missiles with multiple warheads would apply to the current fleet during this interim period.   Policy Path Forward AFGSC has stated that while the technical capacity exists, implementation would require formal direction from national leadership. Decisions would involve coordination across the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration, and U.S. Strategic Command to address warhead allocation, force posture, and operational doctrine. With the expiration of New START, the strategic environment now operates without the bilateral verification mechanisms and numerical limits that governed U.S.–Russian strategic arsenals for more than a decade. Whether the United States proceeds with restoring MIRV capability on its land-based missiles remains subject to policy deliberations in Washington.

Read More → Posted on 2026-02-15 13:44:00

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PARIS : Eutelsat Group has introduced a military-grade portable satellite terminal designed for its OneWeb Low Earth Orbit (LEO) constellation, expanding its secure connectivity solutions for defense and government customers. The new system, developed in partnership with Intellian Technologies, is designated the Intellian OW7MP and is now certified and commercially available for operational deployment. The OW7MP represents the first dedicated military-grade manpack terminal for the OneWeb LEO network. It is intended to provide resilient broadband connectivity in operational environments where terrestrial communications infrastructure is unavailable, disrupted, or subject to denial.   Technical Configuration and Design The Intellian OW7MP is engineered as a portable satellite communications unit capable of being carried and deployed by a single operator. The system is designed to fit inside a standard military rucksack, enabling mobility across remote and forward-deployed locations without reliance on vehicle-mounted platforms. The terminal incorporates one-touch network acquisition, allowing operators to establish a secure satellite link without extensive manual configuration procedures. This rapid setup capability is designed to reduce deployment time in time-sensitive operational environments. The device operates on the OneWeb LEO constellation, which consists of more than 600 satellites in low Earth orbit. By leveraging LEO architecture, the terminal provides lower latency connectivity compared with traditional geostationary satellite systems, supporting real-time data transmission requirements.   Resilient Navigation and Electronic Warfare Adaptation A central feature of the OW7MP is integration of Resilient Global Navigation Satellite System (R-GNSS) technology. This capability enables the terminal to maintain positioning, navigation, and timing functionality in environments where GPS signals may be degraded, jammed, or denied. Such resilience is relevant in contested electromagnetic spectrum conditions and electronic warfare scenarios. The terminal supports both Communications-on-the-Move (COTM) and Communications-on-the-Pause (COTP). This dual-mode functionality allows connectivity during stationary operations, such as temporary command posts, as well as while repositioning in dynamic field conditions. For operational security, the system includes a Transmit Mute (Tx Mute) function. This feature allows the terminal to operate in a receive-only mode, reducing the risk of detection by radio frequency scanning systems during sensitive missions.   Operational Applications According to Eutelsat, the OW7MP is designed to extend high-speed, secure data access to the tactical edge. Intended mission sets include front-line military communications, distributed command-and-control nodes, and intelligence data exchange. Beyond combat operations, the system is positioned for use in emergency response and disaster relief operations, particularly in regions where terrestrial networks are damaged or nonexistent. Additional applications include remote government field deployments, as well as secure communications support for humanitarian organizations and non-governmental organizations operating in austere environments.   Executive Statements Steve Mills, Vice President for Global Government at Eutelsat, said the new terminal addresses requirements for deployable, secure connectivity across varied operational theaters. He stated that governments require communications systems capable of immediate activation in remote and contested environments. Eric Sung, Chief Executive Officer of Intellian Technologies, said the OW7MP was developed to integrate mobility, operational security features, and navigation resilience within a single portable form factor. He noted that the inclusion of Tx Mute and R-GNSS, alongside support for COTM and COTP, was intended to meet mission-critical operational needs without increasing equipment complexity for field operators.   Certification and Availability The Intellian OW7MP has completed certification for operation on the OneWeb LEO constellation and is available for procurement through Eutelsat’s government and defense distribution channels. The product expands Eutelsat’s government services portfolio by adding a fully portable, military-grade terminal optimized for LEO connectivity. With its combination of portability, rapid deployment capability, resilient navigation integration, dual connectivity modes, and transmit control features, the OW7MP is positioned as a field-deployable solution for secure satellite communications across defense, government, and emergency response sectors.

Read More → Posted on 2026-02-15 13:14:08