Switzerland cannot defend itself against a full-scale military attack and must boost military spending faster as security risks rise from Russia, the head of the Swiss armed forces has warned, arguing that neutrality is only credible if it is backed by real combat capability.
In an interview published on Saturday, December 27, 2025, Swiss Armed Forces chief Thomas Süssli said the military is prepared for cyber attacks and for sabotage-style strikes by “non-state actors” on critical infrastructure, but still faces “major equipment gaps” that would cripple mobilisation in a national emergency.
“What we cannot do is defend against threats from a distance or even a full-scale attack on our country,” Süssli said, adding: “It’s burdensome to know that in a real emergency, only a third of all soldiers would be fully equipped.” Süssli is stepping down at the end of 2025.
The Core Problem: Manpower Exists, But Equipment And Stocks Do Not
Switzerland fields a large militia-based force on paper, but Süssli’s comments spotlight a mismatch between assigned personnel and available kit.
As of March 1, 2025, Switzerland had 146,718 service members assigned to formations, according to Swiss reporting on official figures—an indicator of how many people the army can theoretically call on.
Süssli’s warning is that mobilisation at scale would run into hard limits: not enough personal equipment, not enough munitions, and not enough key platform availability to arm and sustain units quickly.
Swiss Military Strength Snapshot: Army, Air Force, And The Reality Of “No Navy”
Army: Large Militia, Limited Heavy Force Depth
Switzerland’s land forces remain built around territorial defence and rapid mobilisation, but heavy equipment is finite.
A Swiss government-linked step toward selling stored tanks in 2023 reported the Swiss military had 134 Leopard 2 main battle tanks in service, with an additional 96 in storage at the time.
Those numbers help illustrate why Süssli is focused on readiness timelines: even where platforms exist, the ability to field them at scale depends on trained crews, spares, ammunition, and logistics, all of which are constrained by funding and procurement pace.
Air Force: Fighters Today, F-35A Transition Under Cost Pressure
Switzerland’s air defence currently relies primarily on F/A-18 Hornets. A compiled inventory list for 2025 indicates 25 F/A-18C and 5 F/A-18D aircraft in service. It also lists 15 F-5E Tiger II still in the 2025 inventory, though these are largely a legacy fleet with limited modern air-defence utility.
Switzerland’s longer-term plan is to replace ageing jets with Lockheed Martin F-35A aircraft, originally approved as 36 jets within a CHF 6 billion budget envelope. But in December 2025, Switzerland said it would reduce the order to the maximum number it can buy within that same CHF 6 billion cap after being told costs would be higher than expected.
That cost squeeze matters because Süssli is warning about threats now, while Switzerland is still in an extended transition period where current fighters and ground-based systems must remain viable.
Navy: No Submarines, No Attack Ships — Only Armed Patrol Boats On Lakes
Switzerland is landlocked and does not have an ocean-going navy, meaning it has no submarines and no attack ships such as destroyers, frigates, or corvettes. Switzerland instead operates armed patrol boats on border lakes for security and training tasks.
This distinction is important because Süssli’s warning is about territorial defence against a modern state threat—something Switzerland would have to meet primarily through land forces, air defence, and resilience of infrastructure, not maritime power.
Money: Defence Ambitions Collide With Federal Budget Limits
Where Swiss Federal Spending Stands
Switzerland’s fiscal debate is intense because defence increases are competing with other politically protected spending.
The federal government said total federal expenditure (ordinary plus extraordinary) was CHF 84.3 billion in 2024, including CHF 1.4 billion in extraordinary spending linked to people from Ukraine seeking protection.
For 2026, Switzerland’s Federal Finance Administration budgeted total expenditure of CHF 90.8 billion, including CHF 0.6 billion again flagged for Ukraine-related protection costs. Separate Swiss parliamentary reporting described expenditure as “around CHF 90 billion” in the final 2026 budget package.
Defence Line Items: Security Spending Rises, But The Readiness Horizon Stays Long
In the federal budget framing, security is a major category. The Federal Finance Administration lists Security expenditure at CHF 7,770 million and notes that more than 80% of that security spending is attributable to military national defence, which is set to rise by CHF 243 million (+3.8%) in 2026, mainly due to higher armaments spending.
Even with that growth, Switzerland’s political target remains comparatively modest. Switzerland has pledged to raise defence spending to about 1% of GDP by around 2032, up from roughly 0.7% now, according to the reporting on Süssli’s interview.
However, the Federal Finance Administration’s own medium-term trend assessment suggests that, at the pace embedded in current plans, armed forces spending might reach 1% of GDP by 2035—later than the political ambition.
Süssli warned that, at the current pace, full readiness would only come by about 2050, calling that “too long given the threat.”
Neutrality Isn’t A Forcefield, Süssli Says
Süssli argued that Swiss public and political attitudes have not shifted enough despite the war in Ukraine and Russian efforts to destabilise Europe, blaming Switzerland’s distance from the conflict, the lack of recent wartime experience, and what he called a false belief that neutrality alone guarantees safety.
Neutrality, he said, “only has value if it can be defended with weapons,” warning that history shows neutral states can still be drawn into war when unarmed.
What Happens Next
Switzerland is already moving to modernise artillery and ground systems while trying to push through the expensive and politically contentious F-35A transition. But the combination of procurement overruns, pressure on the wider federal budget, and a readiness timeline that stretches into the 2040s–2050 period is sharpening the question Süssli put at the centre of the debate: whether Switzerland is willing to pay—quickly enough—for the kind of deterrence its neutrality depends on.
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