LONDON, — May 24, 2026 : Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) utilized a procurement network operating through the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to obtain advanced Chinese satellite communication equipment intended to support its missile and drone programs, according to leaked commercial contracts, customs records, shipping manifests, maritime tracking data, and satellite imagery reviewed by the Financial Times.
The disclosures indicate that the procurement was carried out in late 2025 through a logistics route linking China, the UAE, and Iran, involving commercial intermediaries and maritime transport networks. According to the records, the shipment was facilitated by Telesun, a company registered in the emirate of Ras al-Khaimah, which reportedly handled the transit of satellite equipment on behalf of Iranian entities connected to the IRGC’s military-industrial infrastructure.
Shipment Routed Through UAE Logistics Network
Customs and shipping records reviewed in the report show that the consignment consisted of approximately 1.8 metric tons of Chinese-made satellite communication equipment, packed in six cases and declared in customs documentation as “antennas and accessories.” The shipment reportedly included a 4.5-meter motorized satellite antenna manufactured by the Chinese company StarWin, designed for satellite communications and signal transmission.
The cargo departed Shanghai, China, aboard the Chinese container ship Zhong Gu Yin Chuan before arriving at Dubai’s Jebel Ali Container Terminal on August 28, 2025. After reaching the UAE, the equipment was reportedly transferred through a secondary logistics chain and later loaded onto the Iranian vessel Rama III, which collected the shipment in November for onward transport to Iran.
The documents indicate that the shipment was formally procured by Ertebatat Faragostar Kish (EFK), an Iranian telecommunications company. According to leaked contracts, EFK acquired the equipment for a project managed by the Saman Industrial Group, an Iranian entity sanctioned by the United States in December 2023.
The U.S. Treasury Department previously identified the Saman Industrial Group as a commercial front for the Aerospace Force Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization, a research and development branch of the IRGC Aerospace Force responsible for advancing ballistic missile systems, electronic warfare programs, and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technologies.
Maritime Tracking and Alleged GPS Spoofing
Analysis of maritime navigation data and satellite imagery reviewed by the Financial Times suggested that Rama III employed deceptive maritime tracking practices during its transit to Iran.
According to the report, the vessel transmitted false navigational coordinates through its Automatic Identification System (AIS) in what maritime analysts describe as GPS spoofing, a method used to conceal actual movements by broadcasting inaccurate location data. While AIS transmissions showed the vessel pausing near Oman, satellite imagery reportedly showed no ship at the indicated position.
On November 29, 2025, imagery reportedly identified a vessel matching the dimensions and appearance of Rama III docked at Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas, Iran. Shipping documentation listed the port as the cargo’s final destination.
Iranian Delivery Network and Sanctioned Entities
The domestic handling of the shipment inside Iran was reportedly managed by Blue Calm Marine Services, a company sanctioned by the United States in 2023 for facilitating deliveries connected to Iran’s missile procurement network and missile propellant development programs linked to the country’s defence sector.
The report stated that the satellite equipment was intended to support secure communications, operational coordination, and military connectivity for the IRGC’s missile and drone infrastructure, particularly programs overseen by the Aerospace Force.
UAE’s Role in Sanctions Circumvention Networks
The disclosures also renewed attention on the UAE’s role as a regional transshipment and financial hub for goods and payments linked to sanctioned countries, including Iran and Russia.
Previous investigations, including reporting by the media outlet Militarnyi using data obtained by the PRANA Network hacker group, alleged that Iranian intermediary firms used UAE-registered shell companies and financial accounts to route payments for UAV components and conceal procurement-related transactions from international financial monitoring systems.
According to those findings, intermediary companies allegedly used UAE free-trade zones and logistics infrastructure to bypass restrictions and obscure the financial origin and destination of sensitive defense-related acquisitions.
Broader Expansion of IRGC Aerospace Capabilities
The procurement forms part of a broader pattern of efforts by the IRGC Aerospace Force to expand satellite-enabled surveillance, communications, and targeting capabilities.
Separate reporting cited by the Financial Times indicated that Iran also obtained access to data from a Chinese-built satellite operated by The Earth Eye, identified in previous reports as TEE-01B, which was allegedly used to monitor regional military infrastructure, including U.S. military installations in the Middle East.
Neither Telesun, the UAE foreign ministry, nor Iran’s embassy in London responded to requests for comment cited in the report. The disclosures are expected to increase scrutiny of commercial logistics networks, shipping channels, and free-trade zones allegedly used for the transfer of dual-use satellite and aerospace-related technologies to sanctioned entities in Iran.
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