World
Taiwan’s latest 2025 National Defense Report reads less like a routine policy document and more like a sober warning wrapped in a detailed plan for survival. For the first time in years, the report lays out how the island is reshaping its military around a single, uncompromising objective: preventing the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) from ever reaching Taiwan’s shores. It is a strategy built on massed missiles, unmanned systems, hardened coastal forces, and a vast expansion of asymmetric firepower—all designed to counter a Chinese military that has grown faster and more capable than at any point in modern history. A Rising Threat Across the Strait For Taipei’s defense planners, the picture is clear. China has spent the last decade building new amphibious assault ships, enhancing naval aviation, and introducing specialized landing craft. These platforms, the report warns, have “significantly increased Beijing’s capability to conduct a large-scale invasion operation.” In the face of these developments, Taiwan is shifting away from traditional concepts of defense and doubling down on tools designed to bleed an enemy force before it can land troops. The term that appears repeatedly throughout the report is “asymmetric warfare.” Missiles: Taiwan’s First Line of Resistance The narrative begins with a sweeping expansion of missile production under the 2022–2026 Sea-Air Combat Power Improvement Plan, a $8 billion program that has quietly turned Taiwan into one of the most missile-dense territories in Asia. Across factories and bases, Taiwan has accelerated production of: Hsiung Feng III, its fastest and most lethal anti-ship missile Hsiung Feng IIE, a long-range cruise missile capable of striking targets 1,200 kilometers away Advanced Sky Bow and Sea Sword air-defense missiles These systems are being stockpiled in unprecedented quantities, equipping not only Taiwan’s air, sea and ground forces, but also its growing fleet of missile corvettes and mobile strike brigades. Defense analyst Ben Lewis notes that Taiwan’s success—or failure—may rest heavily on this capability.“Taiwan’s ability to contest PLA command of the air and sea could be the decisive measurement of whether it survives an invasion,” he told Naval News. The MND is already planning a successor program from 2026 onward, focused on strengthening resilience and deepening asymmetric firepower even further. Coastal Defense Transforms into a Kill Zone One of the most significant shifts detailed in the report is Taiwan’s effort to turn its coastline into a fortified web of sensors, missiles and unmanned systems. The Republic of China Marine Corps is at the heart of this change. Its 66th Marine Brigade is being restructured into a littoral strike formation, complete with a new drone battalion and a firepower battalion. These Marines are also being posted at strategic locations around Taipei to counter any Chinese attempt to launch decapitation strikes during the opening phase of an invasion. The Navy is undergoing an even broader transformation. In 2026, it will expand the Haifeng anti-ship missile brigades, integrating them with missile boats, maritime reconnaissance units, and shore-launch Harpoon Block II batteries. Together, these will form a new Littoral Combat Command—a force designed to create overlapping fields of fire across Taiwan’s surrounding waters. “The goal is simple,” analyst Jaime Ocon stated.“To make the 24-nautical-mile contiguous zone a deadly place for any PLA landing force.” New bases already under construction reflect this evolving approach: smaller, distributed, and built to survive long enough to fire their missiles and relocate—a strategy Taiwan has closely studied from Ukraine’s experiences. The Drone Revolution: Taiwan’s New Air Power Yet perhaps the most dramatic part of Taiwan’s defense transformation lies in the skies—specifically, in tens of thousands of unmanned systems the island now seeks to deploy. The report lays out a plan for 5,000 drones by 2028, spanning 13 variants across the Army, Navy and Air Force. But the Taiwanese government has since raised that target to 50,000, reflecting how deeply the military now sees drones as essential to survival. Already, domestic firms such as Thunder Tiger are preparing to mass-produce systems like the Sea Shark unmanned surface vessel, while U.S. companies including Anduril are supplying loitering munitions and autonomous air vehicles. Defense Minister Wellington Koo personally oversaw the test launch of an ALTIUS-600M attack drone, underscoring the priority placed on these platforms. Ocon believes Taiwan must think even bigger.“Fifty thousand drones is a great step, but honestly, we need five million.” Analyst Ben Lewis agrees that this is perhaps the most critical transformation underway.“The value of these systems cannot be understated,” he said. Drones will scout for PLA vessels, guide anti-ship missiles, swarm landing craft, deliver precision strikes, and provide real-time targeting data to Taiwan’s dispersed units. They are, in many ways, the nervous system of the island’s new defense network. A Three-Layer Defense Built to Break an Invasion The picture emerging from the 2025 report is a layered defense structure unlike anything Taiwan has attempted before. Layer One: Long-Range FirepowerCruise missiles, Harpoons, HF-series weapons—all tasked with hitting PLA vessels before they close the distance. Layer Two: Coastal Kill ZonesMissile brigades, corvettes, USVs, and littoral marine units working together to shatter amphibious landing waves. Layer Three: Drone Swarms and Asymmetric ForcesTens of thousands of drones providing eyes, precision and relentless harassment, even deep behind enemy lines. Together, these layers form a defensive web intended to complicate Chinese planning, overwhelm PLA ships, and ensure that no landing zone becomes safe. A Strategy Defined by Urgency The tone of the 2025 National Defense Report is unmistakable. Taiwan is preparing—fully, urgently, and systematically—for a scenario where China attempts to take the island by force. Every missile produced, every drone launched and every coastal unit reorganized is part of a race against time. Taiwan is not trying to match the PLA ship for ship or plane for plane. Instead, it is creating a defense structure that forces Beijing to consider whether any invasion could succeed without intolerable losses. If China has spent the decade building the tools of conquest, Taiwan is now building the tools to deny it at every step. And in the narrative laid out by Taiwan’s defense planners, that denial—layered, asymmetric, mobile, and unrelenting—may be the island’s best chance for survival.
Read More → Posted on 2025-11-23 15:24:13
India
India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has kicked off work on Photonics-based RF Memories (PRFM), a cutting-edge evolution of traditional Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM) that could significantly sharpen the country’s electronic warfare (EW) capabilities against modern AESA and low-probability-of-intercept (LPI) radars. A recent DRDO tender from New Delhi explicitly seeks industry partners for the “Development of Photonics Based RF Memories (PRFM) for Jammer Systems”, with the project bid window running through December 19, 2025. If successful, PRFM-based jammers would move India from conventional electronics to light-based RF processing, delivering vastly higher bandwidth, ultra-low latency and cleaner signal replay—key ingredients for deception jamming in modern, radar-saturated battlespaces. From DRFM to PRFM: why DRDO is shifting to light Classic DRFM stores incoming radar pulses electronically, then replays modified versions to create false targets, pull tracking gates off the real aircraft (range/velocity gate pull-off), or blind the radar with tailored jamming. DRFM is already at the heart of several advanced jammer pods worldwide and underpins DRDO’s latest Tempest-type EW systems. However, as radars move to: Wideband AESA arrays Rapid frequency hopping LPI waveforms with complex modulation purely electronic DRFM hardware runs into limits in instantaneous bandwidth, dynamic range and latency. This is where Photonics-based RF Memory comes in. Instead of storing and manipulating RF signals in electronic chips, PRFM maps them onto optical carriers and uses fiber-optic or integrated photonic circuits as the storage and processing medium. Academic and industry work over the past decade has demonstrated PRFM architectures with very wide bandwidth, long, reconfigurable storage times and high signal fidelity, using fibre-based recirculating delay lines and microwave-photonics building blocks. DRDO’s new project aims to pull this kind of technology out of research labs and into operational jammer systems. How a photonics-based RF memory jammer works While DRDO has not published the detailed architecture of its PRFM system, open-source PRFM research and existing photonic EW products give a good picture of the likely approach. Signal captureThe aircraft or platform’s wideband receiver and antenna capture hostile radar emissions across a very broad frequency range (potentially tens of GHz). RF-to-optical conversionInstead of digitising directly into electronic memory, the RF signal is impressed onto a laser carrier using ultra-fast electro-optic modulators (for example, Mach–Zehnder modulators). The radar waveform is now encoded in light. Optical storage and delayThis modulated light is fed into optical delay structures—often long fibre loops or integrated waveguide loops. In many PRFM designs, a frequency-shifting recirculating delay line is used: each loop pass slightly shifts the optical frequency to prevent lasing and allows the signal to circulate many times without degrading, keeping a clean copy available for replay. Photonic signal processingWithin the optical domain, the system can: Vary the timing (range gate deception) Adjust phase and Doppler (velocity gate deception) Generate multiple delayed copies to create clouds of false targets in both range and velocity Combine different optical paths to tailor jamming waveforms Recent studies even show programmable PRFM that integrates signal storage and complex jamming pattern generation in the same photonic hardware. Optical-to-RF reconversion and transmissionWhen the jammer decides to fire, the stored optical waveforms are converted back to RF using high-speed photodetectors, amplified by power RF amplifiers, and transmitted back towards the threat radar via the jammer’s antenna. Because almost all the “heavy lifting” happens at the speed of light in passive or low-loss photonic circuits, the resultant jammer has: Nanosecond-level latency Massive instantaneous bandwidth Extremely high linearity and dynamic range —far beyond what most electronic DRFM racks can deliver. Battlefield Advantages: Smarter Deception, Tougher Survivability For Indian combat aircraft, warships and ground-based EW units, a mature PRFM-based jammer could change the electronic order of battle in several ways. 1. Beating modern AESA and LPI radarsAESA radars like those fielded by top-tier air forces use: Agile frequency hopping Randomised pulse repetition intervals Complex LPI modulation schemes to make life difficult for conventional jammers. PRFM’s huge bandwidth and fast, coherent storage means it can capture these exotic waveforms without losing detail, then replay them with surgically precise delays and phase tweaks. That lets the jammer: Generate coherent false targets that look “real” to the radar Execute advanced range / velocity gate pull-off (RGPO / VGPO) Support exotic constructs like range–velocity compound deception using multi-false-target patterns 2. Multi-threat, multi-beam jammingModern fighters may be illuminated simultaneously by: An airborne fire-control radar A ground-based surveillance radar Missile seekers with their own small AESA heads Wideband PRFM, especially when coupled with frequency-comb or multi-wavelength photonic sources, can store and process many channels in parallel, enabling a single jammer pod to handle multiple threats at once with tailored responses to each. 3. Lower size, weight and power (SWaP)Because photonic circuits can integrate many RF functions—filtering, delaying, mixing—into a small optical chip or fibre module, they are inherently attractive for fighter pods and UAVs, where every kilogram and watt matters. Companies already selling photonic-ECM systems highlight short response times in the nanosecond range and compact, modular designs for airborne, naval and ground platforms. 4. Better immunity to electromagnetic stressSince most of the processing occurs in the optical domain, PRFM modules are naturally immune to many forms of electromagnetic interference and can sit closer to high-power RF chains without the same noise floor issues that plague dense electronic systems. Where PRFM could Appear in Indian Service DRDO has not specified which platform will be first to receive PRFM-based jammers, but the agency’s broader roadmap offers hints. The organisation is already testing an airborne EW suite for the Tejas Mk1A, with plans for more sophisticated systems on future variants and the AMCA stealth fighter. India has also made significant progress on a photonic radar for fighters, UAVs and naval vessels, positioning microwave photonics as a strategic technology area. Existing DRFM-based systems, like advanced variants of the Tempest jamming suite, have laid the algorithmic and software groundwork for complex deception jamming. In that context, PRFM is the logical next rung on the ladder: first as a technology demonstrator on ground or naval EW systems with generous space and power budgets, then miniaturised into airborne self-protection pods and internal suites. Yes, I can work that in. I’ll give you a short updated version of the relevant part so you can see clearly which countries are in this game and how to mention it in your article. You don’t need to change the whole article structure — just insert a section like this near the “Battlefield advantages” or “Where PRFM could appear in Indian service” parts: Global Status Photonics-based RF memories are still an emerging technology, and no country is publicly known to have fully fielded, operational PRFM-based jammers yet. What exists today is a mix of advanced prototypes, lab demonstrators, and early military-oriented products in the broader field of microwave photonics and photonic EW building blocks. However, open-source research, patents and industry disclosures strongly suggest that several major powers are actively pursuing similar concepts: United States – U.S. defence labs, DARPA-backed programmes and industry (including major radar/EW houses) have published work on photonic RF delay lines, recirculating optical memories, and microwave–photonics-based deception architectures for next-generation electronic warfare. These are widely seen as precursors to operational PRFM-like systems, even if the final configurations remain classified. European countries (notably France, Germany, and the UK) – European universities and defence-linked research centres have worked extensively on integrated microwave photonics, optical true-time-delay networks and programmable photonic RF processors, many of which are explicitly framed for radar and EW applications. Some of these efforts are funded under EU / ESA / national defence technology programmes and could feed into future jammer suites. China – Chinese institutes and defence universities have published a steady stream of papers on photonic radar, wideband optical delay lines and optical RF storage, often highlighting their value against modern stealth targets. While details of any operational systems are opaque, the breadth of research suggests that China, too, is exploring PRFM-like capabilities for future EW systems. Israel and a few other high-end EW producers – Countries with strong electronic warfare industries (such as Israel) are heavily invested in compact, high-performance self-protection suites and are known to use microwave photonics in some subsystems. Though there is no open confirmation of a named “PRFM jammer”, it is plausible that similar ideas are being prototyped under classified programmes. In short: India is not late to the party – it is entering a small, high-tech club that is racing quietly to turn photonic RF memories from lab experiments into deployable jammers. For now, no country has openly declared an in-service PRFM jammer, but the US, Europe, China and a handful of advanced EW producers are clearly investing in the same family of technologies. DRDO’s project, therefore, is less an isolated experiment and more a bid to ensure that India is not dependent on foreign suppliers for what could become a core technology in future electronic warfare. A Quiet But Transformational Leap The PRFM tender might look like just another DRDO R&D line item, but in RF engineering terms it is a major doctrinal shift: From electronics-dominated EW to microwave photonics–driven EW From limited-band, reactionary jamming to wideband, predictive, programmable deception From platform-specific hardware to more unified, scalable photonic cores that can be reused across aircraft, ships and ground vehicles If DRDO and Indian industry can successfully turn lab-grade photonic RF memories into rugged, fielded hardware, Indian pilots and commanders will gain a far more agile electronic shield—one able to evolve against future generations of smart, networked, and stealthy sensors. For now, the project is at the competitive bid stage. But the direction of travel is clear: in the electronic battlespace over the Indian Ocean and Himalayas, light is slowly taking over from electrons as India’s most secret weapon.
Read More → Posted on 2025-11-23 14:53:16
World
General Dynamics Mission Systems (GDMS) has announced a major technological milestone with the development of new ultra-wideband (UWB) radome wall designs engineered specifically for next-generation air dominance (NGAD) aircraft, collaborative combat aircraft (CCA), and advanced unmanned and manned platforms of the future. The company confirmed that it has already fabricated Initial Full-Scale Build (IFB) risk-reduction prototypes and successfully conducted radio-frequency (RF) range testing, marking a significant leap toward operational readiness. The effort is now focused on increasing both the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) and Manufacturing Readiness Level (MRL), ensuring the design can smoothly transition into upcoming high-end defense programs. Revolutionising Radome Technology for the Future Battlespace Traditional radomes—protective structures that shield radar antennas while allowing RF signals to pass—have always faced a trade-off: performance across multiple frequencies versus maintaining structural integrity and stealth shaping. General Dynamics’ new UWB radome wall technology aims to break this long-standing constraint. According to GDMS, the new design delivers “significantly broader frequency performance” compared with both legacy radomes and even the latest wideband designs. This improvement is crucial for emerging platforms that will rely on multifunction arrays (MFAs) capable of performing radar, electronic warfare (EW), communications, and targeting functions simultaneously. The company also highlighted that radome geometry can be fully customized to match any airframe while still preserving integrated sensor performance—an essential requirement for NGAD-class stealth fighters where shaping and materials determine survivability. How Ultra-Wideband Radomes Work The breakthrough comes from a re-engineered multi-layer dielectric wall structure capable of handling vastly wider frequency ranges while minimizing RF loss, distortion, and unwanted reflections. Key Principles Behind the Technology Advanced dielectric layeringMultiple composite layers with precisely tuned electrical properties allow seamless RF transmission over extremely wide bandwidths. Low-Observable (LO) integrationMaterials are optimized to maintain stealth shaping, reduce surface reflections, and avoid radar signature “hot spots.” Support for Multifunction Arrays (MFAs)Modern radars no longer transmit in narrow, predictable frequency bands. MFAs hop frequencies rapidly and cover wide spectra for:• long-range air search• electronic attack• passive detection• secure data links• target identification UWB radomes must therefore remain transparent across all these modes without degrading performance. Thermal and structural engineeringNext-gen sensors produce more heat and place greater stress on nose-cone materials. The radome supports high thermal loads and high-g maneuvers expected from sixth-generation aircraft. Why This Matters in Future Air Warfare The significance of ultra-wideband radome technology becomes clearer when looking at how profoundly it reshapes modern air combat. In the realm of electronic warfare, UWB transparency offers a decisive edge. It allows powerful onboard EW suites to operate without obstruction—letting the aircraft jam enemy radars, spoof incoming missiles, and detect low-probability-of-intercept signals with far greater confidence, all while avoiding the performance losses older radome designs often created. This advantage directly strengthens stealth target detection, a mission that next-generation platforms like NGAD must excel at. Future fighters will be expected to spot advanced stealth aircraft such as Russia’s Su-57 or China’s J-20 well before they appear on adversary sensors. By enabling radars to work across a much wider spectrum with cleaner, more consistent transmission, ultra-wideband radomes enhance range, resolution, and resilience against jamming, giving NGAD-class platforms a critical upper hand. The technology also elevates multifunction combat superiority. Modern MFAs conduct several operations at once—communications, targeting, surveillance, and electronic attack—and any limitation in the radome’s transparency can restrict these capabilities. With UWB performance, these complex systems operate smoothly even in dense electronic warfare environments, allowing the aircraft to maintain full combat effectiveness. Finally, the relevance of this technology becomes even greater in the age of AI-driven autonomy. Collaborative Combat Aircraft flying alongside NGAD fighters depend on rapid, uninterrupted data exchange. Tasks like real-time sensor fusion, high-speed data sharing, and AI-enhanced threat detection require massive bandwidth and minimal signal distortion. Ultra-wideband radomes make this ecosystem possible, becoming a foundational element of the data-rich, AI-enabled air battlespace of the future. Future Programs That Could Adopt the Technology Industry analysts suggest that this radome architecture is likely intended for: US Air Force NGAD manned platform US Navy F/A-XX future fighter Loyal Wingman / CCA swarms High-Altitude ISR aircraft Next-gen missiles or hypersonic systems As next-generation military systems move toward distributed sensing, jam-resistant networks, and multispectral tracking, a radome that supports ultra-wideband operations becomes indispensable. A Step Toward Sixth-Generation Superiority With RF testing already completed and prototype structures fabricated, General Dynamics is positioning its ultra-wideband radome as a foundational technology for the United States’ future air combat fleet. As work continues to raise readiness levels, the system could soon become standard on next-gen platforms shaping the battlespace beyond 2030. The new UWB radome design is not merely an improvement—it represents a critical enabler for the sensor-heavy, stealth-dominant, AI-connected air warfare environment of the coming decades.
Read More → Posted on 2025-11-23 14:00:10
World
Russia has confirmed that it is advancing joint production of the Su-75 Checkmate stealth fighter with Belarus, marking one of the most significant steps yet in the development of the single-engine fifth-generation aircraft. The announcement came on 20 November 2025 at the Dubai Airshow 2025, where Rosoboronexport Director General Alexander Mikheev detailed the programme’s progress and expanding international industrial partnerships. According to officials, the first flying prototype is now in final assembly and undergoing bench testing, positioning the aircraft for a first flight in early 2026. This phase includes systems validation, electrical interface checks, and pre-flight structural assessments—crucial milestones after years of delays and uncertainty. Deepening Russia–Belarus Defence Integration The Su-75 Checkmate is evolving into a Union State flagship project, with Belarus playing a growing role in manufacturing avionics, electronic-warfare modules, optics, and mission systems. Minsk sees the project as an opportunity to expand high-value aerospace production and embed itself deeper into Russia’s defence-industrial supply chain. This cooperation also fits Moscow’s broader strategy of distributing production across the Union State to improve resilience under sanctions and increase export competitiveness. Technical Specifications Confirmed by Official Documentation The newly surfaced Russian brochure, featuring the Su-75 and its baseline performance characteristics, provides the clearest technical snapshot of the aircraft to date: Su-75 Checkmate – Basic Specifications (from image document) Maximum takeoff weight: 26,000 kg Maximum flight speed: Mach 1.8–2.0 Service ceiling: 16,500 m Practical flight range: 2,800–2,900 km Maximum combat load: 7,400 kg Weapon mounting points: 13 total / 5 internal bays Radar detection range (RCS 5 m² target): up to 160 km Detection range of ground/bridge target: 120 km Engine thrust: 14,500–16,500 kgf These numbers align with Russia’s plan to market the Checkmate as a lightweight, cost-effective stealth fighter, with performance falling between the F-35 and advanced 4.5-generation aircraft. Export Ambitions: A Lower-Cost Stealth Platform Russia is positioning the Su-75 as an export-friendly fighter, crafted specifically for nations seeking a more affordable path into fifth-generation aviation. The aircraft’s single-engine layout, stealth contours, and internal weapon bays are meant to deliver much of the capability of heavier platforms but at a fraction of the cost. Its design philosophy leans heavily on operational simplicity, ease of maintenance, and payload efficiency, making it attractive to air forces that cannot sustain large twin-engine fighters. With the added flexibility of modular avionics and customizable electronic-warfare suites, including systems sourced from Belarus, Russia hopes the Checkmate will appeal to a broad spectrum of buyers across Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East, especially those shut out of Western fighter programmes or seeking deeper industrial participation than NATO suppliers typically offer. Russia Offers India Full Technology Transfer (TOT) One of the most notable aspects of Russia’s export strategy is its renewed focus on India. Moscow has reiterated that New Delhi has been offered full technology transfer—a rare proposition in the world of fifth-generation fighter development. The offer goes far beyond simple procurement: it includes joint design authority, licensed production, and the freedom to integrate Indian-made sensors, electronics, and weapons into the platform. Russia has even floated the possibility of co-developing a twin-engine variant if the Indian Air Force requires it. This outreach reflects Russia’s determination to preserve its long-standing defence ties with India at a time when New Delhi is rapidly expanding its own aerospace ambitions through the Tejas Mk-2 and AMCA programmes. Challenges Yet despite the enthusiasm surrounding its progress, the Su-75 programme still faces significant headwinds. Western sanctions have placed pressure on the availability of high-end microelectronics, while the aircraft itself must still prove that its stealth characteristics, avionics, and overall performance match the claims made by its developers. The absence of any firm export orders, combined with questions about Russia’s ability to move from prototype to reliable serial production, adds further uncertainty. Financial constraints within Russia’s broader aerospace sector only complicate matters. Ultimately, the success of the Su-75’s first flight will be a crucial turning point—one that could either solidify international confidence or reinforce existing scepticism surrounding the programme’s viability.
Read More → Posted on 2025-11-23 13:38:11
World
South Korea’s accelerating push into the global fighter jet market appears to be paying off, with the UAE reportedly on the verge of purchasing the KF-21 Boramae, while Egypt is said to be in the final phase of acquiring the FA-50 light combat aircraft. These moves follow President Yoon Suk-yeol’s recent visits to Abu Dhabi and Cairo, during which large-scale military cooperation—beyond just aircraft sales—was a central focus. The United Arab Emirates is now “very close” to signing a contract for the KF-21, South Korea’s 4.5-generation multirole fighter. Abu Dhabi’s interest builds on its already long-standing partnership with Seoul across defence technology, missile defence, nuclear power, and advanced weapons development. The UAE currently operates South Korean M-SAM-II ballistic missile interceptors and Korean strike missile systems, and the relationship has expanded into areas such as UAV development, electronic warfare systems, and counter-missile technologies. If the UAE proceeds with the KF-21 purchase, it would gain a major boost to its long-range precision strike capability and greater access to high-grade South Korean and Western air-launched missiles. The cooperation is also expected to open doors to next-generation fighter development programs and advanced UCAV integration, marking one of the most significant aerospace partnerships South Korea has ever secured in the Middle East. Egypt, meanwhile, is reportedly even closer than the UAE to finalizing its purchase of the FA-50 Fighting Eagle. Cairo has already bought South Korea’s K9 Thunder self-propelled howitzers, and the FA-50 deal is expected to include aircraft, TAipers air-to-surface missiles, and potential agreements for extended maintenance, pilot training, and technical support. The FA-50’s affordability, operational versatility, and compatibility with modern Western systems make it an attractive option as Egypt continues modernizing its diverse fighter inventory. These developments come as Saudi Arabia appears to be moving toward the U.S. F-35, though Riyadh has not disengaged from Korea. Saudi officials remain in dialogue with Seoul on future defence collaboration, including possible participation in KF-21 component production, UAV technologies, and other aerospace programs. To meet rising global demand, Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) has expanded its production capacity for both the FA-50 and the KF-21. The FA-50 backlog continues to grow after recent large purchases from Poland and Malaysia, with several nations—including Egypt, the Philippines, and Colombia—engaged in ongoing discussions. The KF-21 has active cooperation tracks with the Philippines, Malaysia, and Saudi Arabia, all exploring long-term aerospace development partnerships. Indonesia, originally a co-developer expected to fund 20% of the KF-21 program, appears to have been relegated to the status of a general buyer after repeatedly delaying payments and failing to meet agreed milestones. While Jakarta still expresses interest in purchasing the aircraft, its influence on the program has significantly diminished. The KF-21 Boramae is designed to replace South Korea’s aging F-4 and F-5 fleets and operate alongside modern platforms such as the F-35A Freedom Knight and F-15K Slam Eagle. It is being configured to integrate advanced armaments such as the Meteor BVRAAM, AIM-120 AMRAAM, long-range precision-strike weapons, and future indigenous missiles. With multiple interested customers and expanding regional partnerships, the KF-21 is positioned to become one of the most influential Asian fighter programs of the coming decade. If the UAE and Egypt finalize their respective deals, South Korea could establish a powerful new defence triangle connecting Seoul, Abu Dhabi, and Cairo, strengthening cooperation in aviation, missile defence, and joint production. This would mark one of the largest expansions of South Korea’s defence export footprint and reinforce its status as a rising global leader in next-generation military aviation.
Read More → Posted on 2025-11-23 13:19:00
World
Germany is negotiating with Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) to buy more Arrow 3 interceptor missiles and to extend its Heron TP drone agreement, as Berlin accelerates efforts to strengthen air and missile defence against Russia, according to reporting by Globes and European defence outlets. These talks come as Germany prepares to declare its Arrow 3 system operational, following a 2023 contract worth about $3.5 billion (nearly €4 billion) – the largest defence export deal in Israel’s history. Arrow 3: Germany Wants More Interceptors for a Regional Shield Germany’s initial Arrow 3 package, approved by the United States in 2023, covers three Arrow 3 batteries as part of the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI), a 24-nation project to build a layered air and missile defence network across Europe. Arrow 3 is designed to intercept ballistic missiles outside the atmosphere, forming the top tier of Israel’s multi-layered defence architecture above systems like David’s Sling and Iron Dome. Each interceptor is estimated to cost around $2 million, making it the most expensive missile in Israel’s defensive arsenal. According to the Globes report, Berlin fears its current stock of Arrow 3 interceptors is too small for a serious crisis with Russia. German planners worry that a sustained missile campaign would quickly deplete existing stocks, leaving gaps in Germany’s own defences and in the wider ESSI shield protecting much of central and northern Europe. The urgency is reinforced by the deteriorating security picture on NATO’s eastern flank. Polish army chief of staff Gen. Wiesław Kukula recently warned that Russia has “begun the phase of preparing for war” with Poland, describing Russian activity as building conditions for potential aggression on Polish territory. Follow-On Deals: A Pattern in IAI’s Export Strategy IAI’s push for follow-on Arrow 3 sales fits a familiar pattern. In 2017, India signed a $1.6 billion contract for Barak 8 air defence systems, then just a month later ordered the naval version of the interceptor in a second deal worth about $630 million. The German negotiations come during a boom period for Israeli defence exports: Elbit Systems recently secured a $2.3 billion contract with an undisclosed customer. IAI’s order backlog has reached a record $25 billion, driven by high demand for missile defence, UAVs and radar systems. The Arrow 3 sale to Germany, valued at around $3.5 billion, remains Israel’s single largest defence export deal. Heron TP: Germany Weighs Extension and New Purchases The second track of the talks focuses on Germany’s long-running use of the Heron TP unmanned aircraft. Since January 2019, German operators have trained and flown from the “Red Baron” squadron at Tel Nof air base in Israel under a nine-year, €900 million agreement. The package includes:Lease of seven Heron TP drones About €170 million earmarked for airport and airspace usage Training, maintenance and technical support embedded in the Israeli Air Force The agreement is now entering its seventh year, forcing Berlin to decide whether to extend, expand or restructure the arrangement. A senior defence official quoted by Globes said it is hard to imagine Germany walking away from Heron TP, given the platform’s operational track record and the substantial investment in German crews and infrastructure. Separately, Bloomberg reported that Germany intends to acquire three additional Heron TP drones for roughly €1 billion, a plan that remains under negotiation and requires approval from the Bundestag budget committee. Follow-up reporting suggests that the bundle combines the purchase of three airframes (around €630 million) with about €300 million in operating costs over five years, potentially expanding the German Heron TP fleet and gradually shifting from pure leasing to mixed lease-and-ownership models. Gaza Ceasefire and the Lifting of a Partial Arms Embargo The current ceasefire in Gaza has eased political pressure on German–Israeli defence cooperation. According to Globes, this is visible in Berlin’s decision to lift a partial arms embargo imposed on 8 August by Chancellor Friedrich Merz, a restriction that had slowed some approvals earlier in the conflict. With the embargo lifted, German ministries and parliamentary committees face fewer political obstacles when reviewing new Arrow 3 interceptor orders and Heron TP procurement packages. Germany’s Role as a Key Israeli Defence Partner Data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) indicate that between 2020 and 2024, Germany accounted for about 33% of Israel’s arms imports, second only to the United States at 66%. Parallel figures from SIBAT, Israel’s defence export authority, show that: Israeli defence exports reached a record $14.795 billion in 2024, an 11.7% increase over 2023 Europe’s share of Israeli arms exports jumped from 35% to 54%, reflecting rapid rearmament and air-defence investments across the continent Within that surge, Germany stands out both as a flagship Arrow 3 customer and a major UAV client through Heron TP. The €377 Billion Question: Germany’s Long-Term Procurement Plan Your original text mentioned that Germany’s 2026 defence procurement plans total €377 billion, with €437 billion in overall spending. That wording makes it sound like a single-year budget, which is misleading. What the leaked Politico documents and follow-on reporting actually show is: €377 billion is the scale of long-term procurement projects laid out in a 39-page planning document tied to the 2026 budget cycle, not a one-year spend. In dollar terms, that procurement wishlist equates to about $438 billion. Germany’s annual defence budget for 2026 is projected at around €117 billion, roughly 2.8% of GDP, with extra flexibility provided by special funds and loosened debt rules. So the numbers are broadly right, but they describe multi-year procurement planning, not a single-year 2026 budget line. Even a small slice of that €377 billion going towards Israeli systems—additional Arrow 3 interceptors, more Heron TP drones, and potentially future Arrow 4 purchases now under discussion—would translate into multi-billion-euro revenue for Israel’s defence industry. Strategic Impact: Beyond Bilateral Trade If Germany finalises the new Arrow 3 and Heron TP agreements, the impact will go far beyond a simple buyer–seller relationship. These acquisitions would significantly strengthen Germany’s exo-atmospheric missile shield, giving Berlin and its ESSI partners far greater confidence against the evolving Russian ballistic-missile threat. They would also deepen the Bundeswehr’s operational integration with Israel’s highly advanced air- and missile-defence ecosystem, especially in areas such as training, doctrine development, and real-time data-sharing. Most importantly, the deals would reinforce Europe’s accelerating shift toward Israeli high-end defence technologies, placing systems like Arrow 3 alongside American platforms such as Patriot and THAAD as core pillars of the continent’s future air-defence architecture.
Read More → Posted on 2025-11-23 13:03:10
India
A quiet but intense struggle is unfolding behind the scenes as Washington and Moscow compete to sell their most advanced stealth aircraft to India. What began as standard defense proposals has gradually turned into one of the most significant arms races in recent years — not on the battlefield, but in diplomacy, technology offers, and strategic persuasion. For Russia, this is a battle it cannot afford to lose. For the United States, this may be the chance to finally break into a market long dominated by Moscow. And for India, the world’s largest democracy and one of the most important military buyers, the emerging competition presents both an opportunity and a dilemma of historic proportions. Russia’s Extraordinary Offer: A Complete Technology Transfer In the beginning, Moscow’s proposal to India for the Su-57 fifth-generation fighter was like any conventional export pitch — a package of aircraft with partial industrial involvement. But everything changed the moment former President Donald Trump publicly signaled that Washington was willing to offer the F-35 to India, something U.S. policy had avoided for years. The Russian response was immediate and unprecedented. Determined not to lose its biggest arms customer, Moscow dramatically enhanced the proposal. Instead of a basic export deal, it offered India complete control and complete access: 100% Transfer of Technology for the Su-57 airframe 100% ToT for the new AL-51 engine Indian assembly and production rights Freedom to integrate Indian or foreign weapons A joint development roadmap for future upgrades For India, which has long sought deeper industrial access to fighter production, this offer stood out as something Russia had never offered to any country before. In Moscow’s eyes, losing India — a country that operates 70% to 80% Russian-origin weapons — would not just be a commercial setback but a strategic defeat. Washington Under Pressure: F-35 Exports Expand Amid Shrinking Markets On the American side, circumstances were shifting as well. A series of cancellations and delays from European partners had placed new pressure on the F-35 program, forcing Washington to widen its export push. That is why the U.S. took steps that would have been unthinkable a few years ago. It agreed to sell the F-35 to Saudi Arabia, even at the risk of friction with Israel. Soon after, discussions began on the possibility of extending a similar offer to India. This move came not just from the desire to counter China, but from a deeper ambition: to crack open the Indian market and reduce Russian influence once and for all. But India’s demands were unlike anything the U.S. has faced in the past. New Delhi made it clear that it would accept the F-35 only under conditions similar to those granted to Israel: Full operational control The ability to install its own weapons Independence from U.S. remote restrictions Complete sovereignty over mission data Until now, Washington has not signaled whether it would meet these conditions. The S-400 Dilemma: An Obstacle the U.S. Cannot Ignore Even if the U.S. eventually agrees to India’s demands, one problem remains — the S-400 air defense system already deployed by India. American officials have repeatedly maintained that the F-35 cannot operate in airspace where Russian radars collect data. The Turkey crisis serves as the most visible example: once Turkey purchased the S-400, its F-35 deal was halted immediately. For India, this would mean operating the S-400 and the F-35 in completely separate environments, with no shared networks, no common bases, and no integrated operations. Such separation goes directly against India’s long-term integrated command approach. Analysts believe this would remain one of the most difficult barriers for any F-35 deployment in India. India’s Existing Arsenal Tilts Toward Russia Another reality complicates the American offer. India’s weapons ecosystem — missiles, radars, datalinks, EW suites, and air-defense networks — is already deeply connected to Russian-origin systems. Any new fighter must fit into this network. The Su-57, by design, integrates naturally: It can operate comfortably with S-400 batteries. It can carry Indian and Russian weapons with minimal modification. It can link into Indian and Russian command systems. The F-35, on the other hand, is known for its strict digital ecosystem. It cannot simply plug into India’s existing Russian and indigenous networks. Instead, it would function as a standalone bubble, technologically isolated from most Indian systems. For many Indian analysts, this is a decisive factor. Why Washington Is Trying So Hard Inside American strategic circles, the motivation is clear. India represents three long-term objectives: Build a stronger Asian counterweight to China Reduce the dominance of Russian technology in the Indian military Secure a major new customer for the F-35 program In each of these, India plays a central role. That is why Washington is pushing harder than ever before. But the U.S. model of tightly controlled weapon ecosystems conflicts with India’s doctrine of strategic autonomy, making negotiations challenging. Why Moscow’s Proposal Resonates More With India For India, Russia’s upgraded offer presents an exceptionally comfortable fit. The Su-57 package does not come with operational restrictions. It offers deep industrial access, the ability to integrate any weapon, and compatibility with existing systems like S-400, BrahMos, and Indian EW suites. Most importantly, it preserves India’s long-standing principle: no foreign power should dictate how Indian military assets operate. Russian officials have quietly framed their offer as the beginning of a multi-decade partnership where India becomes a co-designer, not just a customer. This vision appeals strongly to India’s aerospace ambitions. What Comes Next: A Strategic Choice for Decades India now faces one of its most consequential defense decisions in recent memory. If Washington agrees to full operational control — a major “if” — India gains access to the world’s most advanced stealth fighter. But it comes wrapped in American restrictions and the requirement to separate it from the S-400 ecosystem. If New Delhi chooses Russia’s Su-57, it gains unmatched industrial freedom, complete compatibility with its existing weapons, and a place as a co-developer in future platforms. Whichever path India takes, the decision will shape not only the Indian Air Force but also the global balance of military influence for decades. And the world is watching closely, as the U.S. and Russia fight their quiet war — not on the battlefield, but for India’s skies.
Read More → Posted on 2025-11-22 17:20:24
World
At the G-20 summit, Maxim Oreshkin, who is heading Russia’s delegation, claimed that the World Bank has given Ukraine more money than the whole of Africa combined and that African economies face “biased rejections and complicated procedures” at the World Bank and IMF. His remarks tap into a long-running grievance in the Global South about how global financial institutions treat Africa compared with politically favoured countries such as Ukraine. But World Bank data tell a more complicated story. Russia’s accusation: Ukraine over Africa Russian officials have been making this argument for months. Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Pankin and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov have both said that the World Bank now spends more on supporting the government of Volodymyr Zelensky than on all African countries combined, and that Bretton Woods institutions are being steered by Western political priorities rather than development needs. Oreshkin’s comment at the G-20 repeats that line, adding that African economies face “biased rejections and complicated procedures” when they seek World Bank and IMF funding. His message fits into Russia’s broader diplomatic push in Africa, where Moscow portrays itself as a champion of a “fairer” global financial architecture. How much money has the World Bank mobilised for Ukraine? Since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, the World Bank Group has created a special support platform for Ukraine, channelling both its own resources and large amounts of donor money: According to the Bank’s own figures, nearly US$82 billion in financial support has been mobilised for Ukraine since 24 February 2022, with the overwhelming majority raised on behalf of other donors and partners. Earlier updates show how quickly this ramped up: about US$38 billion mobilised by late 2023, almost US$50 billion by October 2024, and then roughly US$80–82 billion by mid-2025 as additional donor funds were committed. This support is not legally “war funding” in the sense of paying for weapons or combat operations. World Bank rules explicitly prohibit financing for arms, weapons, military equipment or military infrastructure, and bar the Bank from advising on military policy. Instead, the money is used to: keep essential public services running (salaries for teachers and doctors, social protection, pensions) repair energy, transport, water and housing infrastructure damaged by Russian strikes support refugees, internally displaced people and farmers, and stabilise the financial system In practice, this financial lifeline frees up Ukraine’s own revenues for its defence effort, and Kyiv’s partners clearly see it as part of the overall war-time support package. But formally, World Bank money is for civilian budget support and reconstruction, not the war itself. How much does the World Bank give to Africa? The World Bank’s engagement with Africa is long-term and broad, covering infrastructure, health, education, agriculture and climate. Some key data points from the Bank’s own publications: The World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) – its concessional arm for the poorest countries – has, in recent years, sent the majority of its resources to Africa. In FY2022, about 83% of IDA commitments – US$27.5 billion – went to the 48 countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. In FY2025, IDA commitments totalled US$33.8 billion, of which the Africa region received 66% (US$22.4 billion). Looking at the World Bank Group’s regional results page, in FY2025 alone the Bank approved US$26.2 billion for Sub-Saharan Africa (IBRD + IDA operations). On top of that: IFC (the Bank’s private-sector arm) committed US$11.2 billion across Africa. MIGA issued US$1 billion in guarantees. So in one financial year, Africa was the destination for almost US$40 billion in World Bank Group commitments and guarantees, a figure that does not include similar-scale flows in FY2022, FY2023 and FY2024. Over multiple years, the cumulative volume of World Bank and IDA financing to African countries far exceeds the roughly US$82 billion mobilised specifically for Ukraine since 2022. But Ukraine’s package is extraordinarily large for a single country in a short period, which is why it stands out politically. Where does the “more than all of Africa combined” line come from? When Russian officials say the World Bank spends “more on supporting Zelensky than on supporting all of Africa”, they are usually: looking at only a narrow time window (roughly 2022–2024) mixing different institutions (World Bank plus IMF and sometimes other donors) comparing Ukraine’s exceptional, crisis-driven package with annual average flows to Africa For example, Lavrov has cited a figure of US$54 billion committed by the World Bank to Ukraine since early 2022 and argued that this is about twice the annual IMF + World Bank funding for Africa over the same period. That comparison can be technically true only if : restrict the analysis to a couple of crisis years, and treat Ukraine’s one-off emergency package as directly comparable to Africa’s annual flows from these institutions. But it does not reflect the broader reality that: Africa receives the bulk of IDA resources year after year, often two-thirds or more of the total. World Bank commitments to Africa are ongoing and cumulative, whereas Ukraine’s package is a concentrated response to a major war on a middle-income country that was already an IBRD borrower. In other words, the Russian line captures a political contrast in the short term, but it is misleading if presented as a permanent structural preference for Ukraine over Africa. What do World Bank rules actually say? The World Bank formally insists that its operations are guided by economic, not political, considerations. Article IV, Section 10 of the IBRD Articles of Agreement states that the Bank and its officers “shall not be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or members concerned” and that only economic considerations shall be relevant. On the operational side, two sets of rules are important: No financing of war-fighting The Bank’s updated policy on fragility, conflict and violence explicitly says it “does not provide financing for arms or weapons, military equipment or infrastructure, or disarming combatants,” nor does it give advice on military or security policy. That is why money for Ukraine is channelled into civilian uses: budget support, social services, energy repairs, agriculture, housing and similar sectors. Performance-based allocation for poor countries For low-income countries (especially in Africa) that borrow from IDA, resources are distributed through a performance-based allocation (PBA) system, which takes into account population, per-capita income and an index of policy and institutional quality. This is supposed to ensure that poorer and better-governed countries get more concessional finance, though it has long been criticised for being rigid and for not fully reflecting climate and fragility needs. Ukraine, as a middle-income IBRD borrower, is being supported under exceptional crisis policies and trust funds, not under Africa’s normal IDA allocation rules. Why are African countries still angry? Even though African states receive large absolute sums from the World Bank, many leaders and analysts argue that: access to concessional finance remains too limited and too slow, especially for climate adaptation, health and infrastructure IMF–World Bank debt sustainability frameworks penalise investment in long-term development and climate resilience, pushing countries into austerity and discouraging the very spending needed for growth more than half of African low-income countries are at high risk of, or already in, debt distress, which makes it harder to qualify for new loans without tough conditions Against that backdrop, the speed and scale of the Ukraine package is seen by many in Africa as proof that when the West cares enough, the money and flexibility appear quickly – while African requests for similar treatment (for example on climate finance or debt restructuring) struggle to gain traction. That sense of double standard is what Oreshkin is tapping into when he talks about “biased rejections and complicated procedures.”
Read More → Posted on 2025-11-22 16:27:23
World
As Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine drags on, one EU leader is openly trying to slam the brakes on European support. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has declared that Hungary “does not support” the European Union sending any further financial assistance to Ukraine in any form, and is instead urging Europe to back a U.S.-led peace initiative and open direct negotiations with Russia. His stance has turned Budapest into the bloc’s most disruptive voice on Ukraine and raised fresh questions about the durability of EU unity in the war. A fresh clash over money for Ukraine In recent days, Orbán has sharpened his opposition to new funding proposals from European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who is seeking around €135 billion in additional support linked to Ukraine, including military aid and broader financial measures. He has publicly rejected all three ideas: more money from national budgets, new joint EU borrowing, and using frozen Russian assets to finance support for Kyiv. He has described the plan as “the price of prolonging the war” and accused Brussels of pushing a financial blueprint that amounts to a written declaration that “we Europeans are going to war”. In his words, “Hungarian people’s money belongs to the Hungarian people”, and he refuses to divert funds from pensions, family support and domestic businesses to send them to Ukraine, where he claims EU controls over spending are inadequate and corruption risks are high. At the same time, Orbán has praised U.S. President Donald Trump’s emerging 28-point peace plan, saying that Europeans must immediately and unconditionally support the U.S. peace initiative and, in addition to backing Washington, “launch autonomous and direct negotiations with Russia without delay”. He argues that Brussels is fixated on financing and escalating an unwinnable conflict while Washington is at least trying to talk. A long record of blocking EU aid to Kyiv The current confrontation is not a one-off. Since 2022, Hungary has repeatedly used its veto power to slow or water down EU support for Ukraine. In December 2023, Orbán blocked a €50 billion four-year support package for Ukraine – the so-called Ukraine Facility – during a late-night summit in Brussels, even as other leaders moved ahead on opening EU membership talks with Kyiv. After weeks of pressure and intense negotiations, all 27 member states eventually agreed in February 2024 to the €50 billion facility, which includes €17 billion in grants and €33 billion in loans to support Ukraine’s budget, reconstruction and reforms. Orbán dropped his veto only after leaders added review clauses and side assurances, but he made clear that his fundamental objections remained. On the military side, Budapest has also been blocking or delaying top-ups to the European Peace Facility (EPF) – the off-budget fund the EU uses to reimburse arms deliveries to Ukraine. Since March 2023, Hungary has refused to agree to EPF tranches for Kyiv and vetoed a proposed €20 billion military support plan over four years. In early 2025, Orbán went further, warning that financing Ukraine’s war effort would “ruin Europe”, arguing that with U.S. financial support no longer guaranteed, the EU simply cannot afford open-ended commitments to Kyiv’s defence. Why Hungary is taking this line 1. Domestic politics and money pressures At home, Orbán frames his stance as a defence of Hungarian sovereignty and social spending. He repeatedly tells voters that Brussels wants to take money from Hungarian families and pensioners to “burn it in Ukraine”, and that he will not sacrifice domestic priorities to “finance the war”. This message lands in a sensitive context. Since 2022, the EU has frozen or suspended tens of billions of euros in cohesion and recovery funds for Hungary because of concerns over rule of law, judicial independence and corruption. Roughly €22 billion in cohesion funds were initially put on hold; by early 2024, about €6.3 billion in cohesion money was still frozen, and in late 2024 Hungary permanently lost around €1 billion for failing to access part of the suspended funds in time. Critics in Brussels and many analysts argue that Orbán is using his veto on Ukraine and sanctions to pressure the EU into releasing more of this blocked money – effectively turning Ukraine aid and Russia policy into leverage in a broader standoff over rule-of-law conditionality. 2. Deep energy ties with Russia Another key reason is Hungary’s entrenched dependence on Russian energy. Despite EU efforts to cut ties with Moscow, Hungary still relies heavily on Russian natural gas, crude oil and nuclear fuel. The Kremlin-backed Paks II nuclear project, under which Russia’s Rosatom is building two new reactors and providing a state loan, remains central to Budapest’s energy strategy even after the EU’s top court annulled Brussels’ previous approval of state aid for the project. Studies show that imports of Russian nuclear fuel to Hungary and Slovakia in 2024 were well above pre-invasion levels, and recent reporting highlights Budapest’s continued heavy use of Russian oil and gas compared to other EU states. At the same time, Orbán has cultivated a special relationship with Moscow and, more recently, with President Trump. In November 2025 he claimed that Trump agreed to grant Hungary an exemption from U.S. sanctions on Russian energy, underlining Budapest’s determination to preserve these energy flows even as the rest of the EU tries to phase them out. This structural dependence on Russian energy makes Hungary wary of any escalation with Russia and reinforces the government’s incentives to oppose measures – including large-scale aid to Ukraine – that deepen confrontation with Moscow. 3. Minority disputes with Ukraine Relations between Budapest and Kyiv were tense even before the full-scale invasion, largely because of the status of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine’s Transcarpathia region. Since 2015, Ukraine has introduced education and language laws that Hungary says restrict the use of Hungarian as a mother tongue in schools and public life. In March 2024, Hungary sent an eleven-point list of demands to Ukraine and EU partners, insisting on stronger guarantees for Hungarian-language education and minority rights. It has repeatedly linked its position on Ukraine’s EU accession and broader support to these issues. Tensions flared again in May 2025, when Hungary cancelled expert-level talks with Ukraine on minority rights, citing an espionage dispute and mutual expulsions of diplomats. The unresolved dispute gives Orbán another domestic justification for slowing Ukraine’s integration into European structures and for questioning continued aid. 4. Ideological positioning as the “peace camp” On a political level, Orbán is positioning Hungary as the leader of what he calls the “peace camp” in Europe, in opposition to what he describes as a “pro-war Brussels elite”. In his narrative, the rest of Europe is “marching into war” by trying to arm Ukraine to defeat Russia, while Hungary is calling for immediate ceasefire and peace talks. He has argued that continued military and financial support for Kyiv, combined with higher defence spending, will “ruin Europe”, and insists that the only sustainable solution is a negotiated settlement brokered primarily by Washington and Moscow, with the EU playing a secondary role. His public closeness to Trump and scepticism toward deeper EU integration fit neatly into this message. What it means for Ukraine and for the EU For Ukraine, Hungary’s obstruction does not yet mean that aid will stop – other EU governments have repeatedly found ways to pressure, cajole or work around Budapest to keep money flowing. The €50 billion Ukraine Facility ultimately went through, and member states have explored bilateral mechanisms and creative legal routes to bypass vetoes when necessary. But every new veto threat from Budapest complicates the picture. It delays decisions, forces difficult compromises and chips away at the image of a united European front. At a time when U.S. support is uncertain and Ukraine faces mounting battlefield and budget pressures, the prospect that one EU country might block or dilute major packages is a serious concern in Kyiv and many European capitals. Inside the EU, frustration is rising. Think-tank analysts and some politicians are openly debating whether the bloc should suspend Hungary’s voting rights on foreign-policy and budget issues if it continues to use its veto to paralyse decisions on Ukraine and Russia – a drastic step, but one that illustrates how central Orbán’s resistance has become to the wider struggle over Europe’s response to the war. For now, Hungary remains the outlier in an EU that still officially backs “Ukraine for as long as it takes”. Whether Orbán’s bet on “peace first, aid later” gains traction – or simply isolates Budapest further – will be one of the key questions for Europe as the war and the political battles around it enter yet another year.
Read More → Posted on 2025-11-22 16:00:22
World
On 17 November 2025 Canada and Germany have taken a major step toward deepening their defence and industrial partnership with the signing of a government-to-government (G2G) contract that will equip the German Navy with Lockheed Martin Canada’s CMS 330 combat management system. The agreement, facilitated by the Canadian Commercial Corporation (CCC) and Germany’s Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support (BAAINBw), is valued at more than $1 billion, marking one of Canada’s largest defence exports in recent years. A Milestone in Canada–Germany Defence Cooperation Canada’s Minister of International Trade welcomed the signing, describing it as a landmark achievement that reinforces both countries’ shared commitment to collective security and advanced defence cooperation. The deal reflects a growing strategic alignment between Ottawa and Berlin as Europe accelerates military modernization in response to rising global tensions. The CMS 330, originally developed for the Royal Canadian Navy’s Halifax-class frigates, integrates a vessel’s sensors, weapons, communications and decision-support tools into a single unified platform. The system offers enhanced situational awareness and supports air, surface and subsurface warfare, making it a highly adaptable solution for modern naval operations. Strengthening Interoperability Between Allied Navies By adopting CMS 330, the German Navy will align its combat systems more closely with those of the Royal Canadian Navy. Defence officials say this will significantly improve interoperability during NATO missions, joint exercises and multilateral maritime operations. Germany is expected to deploy the CMS 330 on its next-generation F127 air-defence frigates, with possibilities for integration in future fleet upgrades. The system’s open-architecture design also allows for continuous upgrades in line with evolving mission requirements. Economic Impact and Industrial Collaboration Beyond its strategic value, the contract marks a major boost for Canadian defence exports. Ottawa emphasized that the agreement will support high-skilled jobs, drive innovation and expand Canada’s footprint in the European defence market. The partnership will involve extensive collaboration between Canadian and German industry, including integration work, component manufacturing and long-term technical support. For Germany, the acquisition ensures access to a proven, advanced combat management system at a time when Berlin is rapidly modernizing its armed forces under its expanded defence budget commitments. A Pillar of Renewed Canada–EU Security Engagement The CMS 330 contract builds on the Canada–EU Security and Defence Partnership, as well as a trilateral maritime cooperation pact between Canada, Germany and Norway signed in 2024. Canada and Germany have also deepened coordination at recent NATO summits as both nations push for stronger transatlantic defence resilience. Officials on both sides underscored that Canada and Germany share “a deep commitment to democratic values, international law and collective security,” framing the new contract as a practical expression of those principles. Installation and integration of CMS 330 on German Navy vessels will take place over the coming years, with joint working groups already in place to coordinate timelines, testing and operational certification. Analysts expect the deal to open the door for further Canadian defence technology exports, including potential future systems for European navies seeking NATO-aligned solutions. As the agreement moves toward implementation, it stands as a powerful symbol of closer Canada–Germany defence cooperation and a significant milestone in Canada’s rise as a global defence technology exporter.
Read More → Posted on 2025-11-22 15:44:15
World
London / Abu Dhabi — In a contentious exposé that has rippled across media and political circles, UAE-based strategist Amjad Taha argues that Britain’s democratic institutions are being exploited by Islamist actors bent on creating a domestic terror nexus. He claims Western compassion has morphed into strategic failure, emphasising that Arab states view Britain’s approach as “multiculturalism masquerading as security blindness”. Britain’s Democracy Under Siege, Says Taha Taha contends that the United Kingdom’s political class is bending under pressure from Islamist ideologies that inject themselves into civic and charitable infrastructures. His narrative holds that democracy—meant to ensure freedom and pluralism—is being turned into a conduit for radicalisation. In social-media posts he declares that British leaders are “bowing to Islamists who exploit democracy to turn Britain into a hub for extremism.” Recent commentary in UK media echoes his concerns. An article in Quillette asserts that while the Islamist threat in Britain is growing, official institutions show “off-the-books denial” of its scale or roots. Taha cites what he perceives as a stark double standard in Western responses: When Islamist-linked figures are active in Britain, they are treated as community activists or charitable operators; but similar actors in the UAE or other Gulf countries would be designated terrorists and jailed. He contrasts the “liberal, civilised” behaviour of Muslims in Dubai with what he sees as secrecy and extremism among some Muslim groups in London or Berlin. Arab States’ Rejection of Migrants and Islamist Networks Taha argues that many Arab nations are sharply cognisant of the threat posed by Islamist-embedded migration flows—and thus reject migrants who appear to have ideological baggage. In contrast, he says Europe’s open-arms policies are invariably labelled as compassionate, but he brands them “the suicide of the West”. He points to concrete examples: the UAE has banned the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Relief, two bodies often cited by Gulf states as ideological threats. He asks: if Arab states take these steps, why are Western states hesitant? Sudan, Hamas and Diplomatic Passports: A Regional Nexus Beyond the UK, Taha spotlights the case of Sudan. He asserts that following the 7 October attacks in Israel, a militant-Islamist regime in Port Sudan granted diplomatic passports en masse to members of Hamas. While independent verification is limited, US and regional sources confirm that the Muslim Brotherhood’s Sudanese branch remains influential in military, political and security domains. A US Senate hearing in 1998 already flagged Sudan’s involvement in Islamist terrorism and asylum networks. Taha uses this as a cautionary tale: when states with little oversight grant diplomatic immunity or citizenship to Islamist operatives, these individuals gain mobility and cover. In his view, Britain and other Western nations are less vigilant about equivalent flows disguised as “refugees” or “students”. Policy Failures: Europe’s Multicultural Experiment Under Strain Taha frames his critique in moral and strategic terms: He asks why women in districts such as Neukölln (Berlin) or Solingen face restrictions on dress or speech, while children in some mosques influenced by the Brotherhood reportedly learn antisemitic tropes. He asserts this isn’t multiculturalism—it’s “multiplying terrorism.” He further argues that the fear of being labelled “Islamophobic” silences legitimate critique of Islamist ideology, shielding radicalised actors in European society. This, he says, contrasts with the Gulf model, where Islamist networks are explicitly proscribed and jailed if deemed terrorist. A West at Risk? The broader question Taha poses: Is the West’s welcoming posture an expression of compassion—or a strategic failure to protect its citizenry? He argues that failing to guard against ideology is akin to “not protecting your people from evil,” and warns that tomorrow’s attacker might be a “newly naturalised citizen who was radicalised next door”. Taha urges immediate policy recalibration in Britain and the wider West: rethink citizenship criteria, reform charitable-funding oversight, rethink mosque governance, and open civic discourse on Islamist ideology. He emphasises that Arab states would prefer a party such as Germany’s Alternative for Germany (AfD) to govern rather than Western parties that, in his view, kowtow to Islamist interests. Critical Perspectives and Gaps While Taha’s assertions are forcefully made, some caveats apply. Verified public records of large-scale Islamist exploitation of democratic institutions in Britain remain contested; academic sources emphasise complexity rather than clean conspiracies. Moreover, migration and integration dynamics are influenced by a wide array of social, economic and legal factors—not simply ideological infiltration. The framing that Arab nations uniformly “reject migrants” may overgeneralise highly heterogeneous Gulf policies. Amjad Taha’s argument offers a sharply critical vantage point on the intersection of migration, Islamist ideology and Western democracy. Whether one agrees with all his specifics or not, his warnings pose pressing questions: How far should Western states allow democratic spaces to be used by ideological networks that may oppose democratic foundations? When does compassion become strategic vulnerability? And how can societies balance integration and security without sliding into illiberalism? As Britain sits at the crossroads of identity, migration and ideological challenge, Taha’s exposé serves as a provocative invitation to rethink the balance between openness and protection.
Read More → Posted on 2025-11-22 14:32:04
World
In a major milestone for the U.S. submarine force, Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII) announced today that its Newport News Shipbuilding (NNS) division has officially delivered the nuclear-powered fast-attack submarine USS Massachusetts (SSN 798) to the United States Navy. The delivery marks a key achievement in the ongoing build-out of the Virginia-class submarine programme. Construction and industrial partnership The USS Massachusetts is the 12th Virginia-class submarine delivered by Newport News and the 25th built overall under the teaming agreement with General Dynamics Electric Boat. More than 10,000 shipbuilders from NNS and Electric Boat participated in the construction of SSN 798, supported by thousands of suppliers across the U.S., including more than 20 suppliers from Massachusetts. NNS President Kari Wilkinson said: “Delivering Massachusetts after its rigorous sea trials is an important milestone commitment for our team this year. We are absolutely steadfast in our resolve to increase the pace of submarine construction and see this as a solid step toward our overall objective.” Key specifications and capabilities The USS Massachusetts belongs to the Virginia-class of nuclear-powered fast-attack submarines, designed for a broad spectrum of missions including anti-submarine warfare, intelligence gathering, special operations support and land-strike. Key specifications: Length: ~377 feet (115 m) Beam: ~34 feet Displacement: ~7,900 tons Propulsion: S9G nuclear reactor with unlimited range Speed: 25+ knots submerged Crew: ~135 personnel Armament: Mk-48 torpedoes, Tomahawk cruise missiles, and for newer blocks, the Virginia Payload Module Special features: stealth shaping, photonics masts, modular electronics and weapon systems The contract and production context The broader programme for the Virginia-class has been structured through multiyear contracts. According to open-source accounts, a contract valued at around US $17.6 billion was awarded in 2014 to Electric Boat for ten submarines. The class is planned to eventually reach up to 66 boats across several Blocks (I–V and potentially beyond) as part of the Navy’s undersea strategy. In the teaming arrangement, Newport News and Electric Boat alternate major assemblies: one builds certain modules, the other completes others, to maintain two ship-yards capable of nuclear submarine production in the United States. By delivering SSN 798, NNS demonstrates continued throughput in this industrial base. Significance and outlook With the delivery of USS Massachusetts, the U.S. Navy strengthens its undersea warfare capabilities at a time of increasing global naval competition. Virginia-class submarines are considered among the world’s most advanced and stealthy attack submarines, capable of executing multi-mission roles across the globe. The scale of the project — involving thousands of skilled workers and suppliers nationwide — also underscores the importance of the submarine industrial base to U.S. manufacturing and defense readiness. Following delivery, the USS Massachusetts will undergo final outfitting and preparations before commissioning, becoming the fifth U.S. Navy vessel to carry the name of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The delivery of USS Massachusetts (SSN 798) represents a critical milestone for both the U.S. Navy and America’s submarine-building enterprise. As the 25th Virginia-class submarine and the 12th from Newport News, the boat further strengthens the Navy’s ability to maintain undersea superiority for decades to come.
Read More → Posted on 2025-11-22 14:07:31
World
Pakistan’s Economic Coordination Committee (ECC) has approved a supplementary defence budget of PKR 50 billion—a major injection of funds aimed at boosting border security, strengthening naval infrastructure, and safeguarding critical assets linked to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The approval came during a meeting chaired by Finance Minister Muhammad Aurangzeb, marking yet another year where defence spending has risen outside the formal national budget. A Large Off-Budget Boost for the Military Of the newly approved funds, PKR 39 billion has been assigned to the Pakistan Army and PKR 11 billion to the Pakistan Navy. The Navy’s portion will be used to upgrade two major naval bases, enhancing maritime logistics, surveillance systems, and coastal defence capabilities in the Arabian Sea—particularly around Gwadar Port, a strategic CPEC hub. This comes in addition to Pakistan’s existing regular defence budget of PKR 2,550 billion for FY 2025-26, indicating a growing trend of defence expenditures being made outside the official allocations. Last year, the ECC similarly approved PKR 45 billion in off-budget defence spending. CPEC Security Takes Centre Stage Security of the CPEC route—heavily targeted by Baloch insurgents and other militant networks—remains a priority. As part of the supplementary spending: PKR 19 billion has been allocated to the Special Security Division South, a 19% increase from last year. PKR 8 billion goes to the Special Security Division North. PKR 2 billion is directed toward border fencing, surveillance, and anti-infiltration measures along the volatile Afghanistan and Iran borders. These forces, built specifically for CPEC protection, have steadily expanded as attacks on Chinese personnel and infrastructure continue. Internal Security Reinforcements The ECC has also approved: PKR 9.9 billion as internal security duty allowance for Army personnel PKR 150 million for the Pakistan Air Force PKR 841.6 million for the Interior Ministry to reinforce civil armed forces battling insurgency and smuggling Officials maintain that such spending is necessary due to persistent militant threats and cross-border instability. Critics Highlight Economic Crisis and Civilian Suffering The announcement has sparked renewed criticism inside Pakistan, where inflation, unemployment, and poverty remain at alarming levels. Pakistan is still negotiating and requesting fresh loans from the IMF and friendly nations, highlighting the financial strain on the country. Despite this, defence spending continues to rise: Public healthcare and education remain severely underfunded Millions struggle with food insecurity Salaries and pensions for civilians lag far behind inflation Economic analysts and political observers argue that Pakistan’s military establishment—not its elected government—continues to dominate national decision-making, prioritizing defence expansion over social welfare. For decades, no civilian government has been able to function without the approval of the Pakistan Army, which maintains strong influence over political, economic, and foreign policies. Moreover, Pakistan’s top military generals are widely believed to be among the wealthiest army elites in the world, owning vast real estate portfolios, business stakes, and defence-linked enterprises. Critics claim that this entrenched wealth and power structure creates little incentive for the military to redirect funds toward citizen welfare. Civil society activists argue that while ordinary Pakistanis are struggling with high prices, unemployment, and energy shortages, the state continues to “always have money for the military—but never for the people.” Heightened Tensions With India This surge in military spending comes at a moment of sharper rhetoric from New Delhi. India’s Chief of Army Staff, General Upendra Dwivedi, recently warned that India is fully prepared for multi-domain warfare and emphasized that “dialogue and terrorism cannot coexist.” He stressed that India will deal firmly with both terror groups and the states that support them—widely interpreted as a reference to Pakistan. A Region Preparing for Multiple Contingencies Pakistan’s renewed defence investment underscores its strategic priorities: securing CPEC, reinforcing borders with Iran and Afghanistan, and upgrading naval and surveillance infrastructure. Meanwhile, India’s assertive military modernization continues, contributing to an environment where both nations are rapidly expanding capabilities despite economic pressures on their populations. The contrast remains stark: even as Pakistan seeks loans to avoid financial collapse, billions continue to flow toward the military, reaffirming once again which institution truly controls the country’s direction.
Read More → Posted on 2025-11-22 13:42:00
World
In a significant shake-up to Europe’s emerging deep-fires landscape, Norway has officially eliminated KNDS Deutschland’s EuroPULS from its Long Range Precision Firing Systems (LRPFS) competition, narrowing the contest to just two contenders: the U.S.-built HIMARS and South Korea’s K239 Chunmoo. The decision, first reported by the German defense outlet Hartpunkt on 21 November 2025, has sent ripples through NATO capitals and injected new tension into what had been a deepening German-Norwegian defense partnership. A Strategic Partnership Meets an Unexpected Fracture Norway’s move comes at an awkward diplomatic moment. Berlin and Oslo have spent the past two years expanding joint industrial programs, including: 212CD submarines, currently under construction The joint acquisition of Leopard 2A8 main battle tanks, with the first units handed over this week at KNDS facilities in Munich Long-term plans for shared maintenance, ammunition pipelines, and land warfare integration EuroPULS was widely expected to serve as a cornerstone of a future European deep-fires architecture, offering a continent-wide alternative to U.S. systems. Instead, Norway’s decision to cut it from the competition has become a high-visibility stress point in the partnership. According to defense officials in Oslo, the decision was based on operational performance requirements, delivery timelines, and the need for combat-proven systems—an area where EuroPULS still lags behind its competitors. What Norway Wants: Range, Readiness, and Integration With Allies Norway’s approach to modernizing its artillery forces reveals a very clear mindset: Oslo is not looking for promises—it wants capabilities it can deploy right now. The LRPFS program is shaped by a sense of urgency driven by Russia’s growing militarization in the High North, and Norway’s decisions reflect a hard-nosed focus on practicality over political symbolism. 1. Immediate Combat Readiness For Norway, readiness is not negotiable. The country wants a system that is already rolling off production lines, not one still undergoing development cycles. It wants launchers and munitions with a proven combat record, supported by a mature logistical ecosystem that can be sustained for decades. When these criteria are applied, it becomes obvious why HIMARS and Chunmoo immediately stand out, given their deployment history in Ukraine, the Middle East, and the Korean Peninsula. EuroPULS, still evolving and reliant on munitions under development, simply cannot compete with that level of maturity. 2. Full NATO Interoperability Another decisive factor is Norway’s insistence on seamless integration with NATO fire-control and command networks. With the U.S., UK, Poland, and the Baltic states standardizing around HIMARS, it has effectively become the backbone of NATO’s modern deep-fires structure. For Norway, aligning with that ecosystem is not just sensible—it is strategically imperative. Any system that complicates data links, software integration, or joint operations becomes a liability, not an asset. 3. Long-Range Strike Options Norway also wants true long-range strike capability, not theoretical range projections. Oslo is aiming for strike envelopes extending beyond 150 km, with an ideal threshold approaching 300 km or more. Here again, HIMARS has an immediate advantage with ATACMS and soon the even more advanced PrSM, already demonstrating long-range precision in test flights. Chunmoo also fits neatly into this expectation, offering scalable long-range munitions depending on the missiles selected. EuroPULS, by contrast, is still working toward fielding such ranges. Why Norway Rejected EuroPULS Interviews with Norwegian and German defense insiders outline several factors behind the rejection: • Immature ammunition portfolio EuroPULS relies on a launcher designed by Israel’s IMI (Lynx) combined with a European-developed guided munition family still in early development.Norway reportedly concluded that: No long-range rocket (200–300 km class) is yet operational Full integration of new European rockets is still several years away The system relies heavily on future promises rather than existing capability • Integration uncertainties EuroPULS would require: New NATO data-links New digital fire control interfaces Unique maintenance infrastructure Norway judged that this would slow deployment and complicate interoperability with allies already using HIMARS. • Delivery timelines too slow Norway wants first units by 2027–28. Germany reportedly could not guarantee industrial timelines inside that window due to ongoing capacity pressure from Leopard tank and artillery production. • High strategic risk EuroPULS was meant to be a pan-European alternative to U.S. dependence. But Oslo’s position is that its national readiness cannot rely on a system still under construction. A Norwegian defense official, speaking off-record, summarized the decision:“We do not have the luxury of waiting for a European launcher to mature while our region militarizes.” How EuroPULS Compares to HIMARS and Chunmoo EuroPULS (Germany/KNDS) Based on Israeli Lynx launcher Modular pod system Compatible with multiple rocket types European long-range guided rockets still in development No combat service in NATO Uncertain 200+ km capability timeline Strength: high modularity Weakness: system maturity, munitions availability, delivery risk HIMARS (United States) Combat-proven in Iraq, Syria, and Ukraine Fires: GMLRS (80+ km), ER-GMLRS (150+ km), ATACMS (300 km) Future PrSM (500 km class) already in test phase Fully NATO-integrated Massive global supply chain Seen as the gold standard for long-range precision fires Chunmoo (South Korea) Highly modular like EuroPULS but already fielded Fires: 130 mm rockets (36-pack) 230 mm guided rockets (80+ km) 290 mm tactical missile (~290 km) Poland has already integrated Chunmoo onto HIMARS logistics systems, proving interoperability Fast delivery timelines, cost-effective procurement For Norway, Chunmoo offers HIMARS-like range with more munition flexibility and shorter delivery schedules. A Blow to Europe’s Artillery Ambitions EuroPULS was meant to symbolize Europe’s long-awaited push for independence in deep-fire capabilities, but Norway’s decision to drop it has cast serious doubt over that vision. It raises uncomfortable questions for Europe: Can the continent actually build a sovereign rocket artillery system quickly enough to matter? Will countries like the Netherlands, Denmark, or Italy now quietly shift toward HIMARS, rather than rely on a developing European platform? And perhaps most crucially, does this rejection reflect a deeper loss of confidence in Germany’s ability to deliver major defense programs on time? Across NATO, criticism toward Germany’s slow procurement cycles and delayed defense programs is getting louder. Norway’s move reinforces the perception that Europe still struggles to match the speed and readiness offered by non-European suppliers, especially the United States and South Korea. What Happens Next From this point onward, Norway will focus on two final contenders: HIMARS and Chunmoo, with a contract decision expected around mid-2026. Many defense analysts see HIMARS as the frontrunner due to its deep integration within NATO and proven combat record. Yet Chunmoo remains a surprisingly strong challenger, especially after Poland successfully integrated it into a mixed HIMARS–Chunmoo launcher fleet, proving its flexibility and fast delivery potential. Norway’s final decision will not only shape its own artillery modernization but will also signal where European militaries believe the most reliable and rapidly deployable firepower truly lies. A Decision That Resonates Across NATO Norway’s rejection of EuroPULS is far more than a procurement update—it reflects a deeper shift in NATO thinking. It shows how urgently frontline states now prioritise real, deployable capability over long-term industrial promises. It demonstrates a clear preference for battle-tested systems rather than politically symbolic European projects still in development. And it underscores how rapidly Europe is turning toward U.S. and South Korean defense technology for next-generation artillery. The decision reveals a growing concern over Europe’s ability to field advanced deep-fires at the speed today’s security environment demands. In this context, Germany’s ambition to lead a European artillery renaissance has taken a major hit. EuroPULS falling out of the Norwegian competition highlights a widening capability gap—one that, for now, only proven systems like HIMARS and Chunmoo seem capable of filling.
Read More → Posted on 2025-11-22 13:09:25
World
Delhi-based VEDA Aeronautics has signed an agreement with French firm METRAVIB Defence to integrate acoustic gunshot-detection and drone-detection systems on light tanks, main battle tanks and armoured vehicles under the ‘Make in India’ framework. The partnership aims to give Indian armoured formations an automated “early-warning ear” against small-arms fire, anti-tank weapons and low-flying drones. According to social media posts and defence industry reports, the collaboration is structured as an exclusive Make in India partnership, with VEDA responsible for local integration, industrialisation and support, while METRAVIB provides its combat-proven acoustic technology. What These Systems Are And How They Work METRAVIB, a brand of the French ACOEM group, specialises in acoustic situational awareness solutions that detect and locate gunshots, explosions and drones in real time by analysing sound waves. On armoured vehicles, METRAVIB’s flagship product line is the PILAR Vehicle Protection system – a compact tetrahedral array of microphones mounted on the roof, linked to a processing unit and the vehicle’s battle management system (BMS). In simplified terms, the system works in four steps: Detection When a weapon is fired, it generates a muzzle blast and, for supersonic rounds, a shock wave. The microphones around the vehicle capture these acoustic signatures from all directions. Time-Difference Analysis The system measures the tiny differences in the time at which each microphone hears the sound. Using these delays, it triangulates the direction and elevation of the incoming fire. Classification And Ranging Digital signal processors and AI-based algorithms compare the recorded signature with a threat library. The system can classify calibre types and estimate range; PILAR Vehicle Protection typically offers 360° coverage with accuracy of about ±2° in azimuth, ±3° in elevation and ±10% in range, and detection envelopes from 250 m up to around 24 km, depending on the weapon. Cueing Weapons And Crew The calculated bearing, elevation and distance are pushed to the vehicle’s BMS or fire-control / remote weapon station, allowing slew-to-cue of the turret or RWS towards the threat. The crew gets an immediate visual display and audio alert, often with GPS coordinates of the shooter. The same acoustic principle is extended to drone detection. Small UAVs and quadcopters emit distinctive propeller and motor noise patterns; METRAVIB’s newer solutions use onboard acoustic AI to identify and track such targets against background noise, even when they are difficult to spot optically or on radar. What The VEDA–METRAVIB Deal Brings To India While detailed technical specs of the India-specific configuration have not been published, Indian defence outlets state that the partnership will see: Gunshot-detection modules for mounting on: Light tanks (such as future high-altitude platforms), Main battle tanks (MBTs), Infantry combat vehicles and other armoured platforms. A new anti-drone acoustic module entering the Indian market for the first time through this tie-up. Real-time cueing to onboard battle management and fire-control systems, allowing rapid counter-fire or defensive manoeuvres. VEDA Aeronautics, which already works on AI-driven military technologies, electro-optics and robotics, is expected to handle system integration, adaptation to Indian vehicles and eventual local manufacture, in line with the government’s Atmanirbhar Bharat / Make in India drive. Combat-Proven Technology Coming To Indian Platforms METRAVIB’s PILAR family is combat-proven in more than 45 countries, and variants are already fielded on France’s Griffon and Jaguar armoured vehicles under the SCORPION programme, as well as on other NATO platforms. On these vehicles, the system: Provides continuous 360° coverage and remains “always on”. Filters outgoing friendly fire, reducing false alarms. Can detect not just small arms but also RPGs, mortars and medium-calibre weapons, and share threat data between multiple vehicles to triangulate shooter positions. The Indian integration is expected to follow a similar concept: armoured vehicles networked through a BMS will be able to share acoustic threat data, improving situational awareness and enabling faster, more accurate retaliatory action. Make In India, Export Potential And Next Steps The agreement also has an industrial dimension. With VEDA as the Indian partner and system integrator, the programme aligns with: Local manufacturing and assembly of key subsystems over time. Building domestic capability in acoustic sensing, AI-based signal processing and vehicle vetronics. Possible future exports of India-integrated solutions to friendly countries operating similar platforms. Given METRAVIB’s experience moving from pure sensors to data fusion and collaborative combat, and VEDA’s focus on AI and robotics, the partnership could evolve beyond simple gunshot detectors into broader situational-awareness suites integrating acoustic, optical and electronic sensors on Indian vehicles. Formal details such as order quantities, platform lists and timelines have not yet been disclosed. However, the tie-up underlines a clear trend: Indian armoured units are preparing for a battlefield where the first warning may not be something they see, but something their vehicles hear – and react to – in milliseconds.
Read More → Posted on 2025-11-22 05:18:38
World
Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL) has doubled the production of the indigenous Akash surface-to-air missile (SAM) from around 50 missiles a month to nearly 100, significantly boosting India’s ability to replenish war stocks and meet a growing export pipeline, according to defence-industry reporting and company-linked updates. This marks a major scaling-up of one of India’s most important short-range air-defence systems at a time of heightened tensions with Pakistan and China, and rising overseas demand. From 50 to 100 missiles a month For years, BDL’s Akash production hovered around 50–60 missiles per month, a rate that supported initial inductions by the Indian Army and Indian Air Force. In the wake of Operation Sindoor and the 2025 India–Pakistan confrontation—where the Akash system reportedly played a key role in neutralising hostile drones and missiles—New Delhi directed missile manufacturers to accelerate supplies. Hyderabad-based firms that feed the Akash ecosystem were specifically asked to fast-track deliveries to strengthen readiness along the western and northern borders. Industry sources now indicate that BDL has successfully ramped up Akash output to about 100 missiles per month, effectively doubling capacity and aligning actual production with a long-stated DRDO target first floated in 2016. Contract backlog and Army deployments The production surge comes on the back of a substantial order backlog. In March 2023, the Ministry of Defence signed contracts worth over ₹9,100 crore, including more than ₹8,160 crore for two additional regiments of improved Akash Weapon System (AWS) for the Indian Army’s northern borders. The improved Akash features seeker technology, 360° engagement capability and a reduced footprint, optimised for high-altitude and rugged terrain deployment against aircraft, cruise missiles and UAVs. Recent high-altitude trials of Akash Prime at around 15,000 feet in Ladakh further validated the missile’s performance in extreme environments, reinforcing the Army’s push for faster deliveries and sustained high-rate production. Specs: a fully indigenous air-defence workhorse The Akash is a medium-range, mobile surface-to-air missile system developed by DRDO and produced by BDL along with Bharat Electronics Limited and a large network of Indian suppliers. Key characteristics include: Range: approximately 4.5–25 km, with upgraded variants able to reach further Altitude coverage: from about 100 m up to 20 km Speed: supersonic (up to around Mach 2.5–3 depending on variant) Warhead: ~60 kg high-explosive, pre-fragmented Guidance: command guidance with radar-based tracking, and active seeker on newer versions Radar: the Rajendra phased-array fire-control radar can track dozens of targets and guide multiple missiles simultaneously The system is fully mobile, mounted on tracked or wheeled launchers, and can engage fighter aircraft, cruise missiles, precision-guided munitions and UAVs, providing point and area defence for critical bases and formations. Exports to Armenia and interest from Asia The Akash production ramp is not only about domestic needs; it is also tied to India’s defence export drive. In late 2024, India shipped its first Akash air-defence battery to Armenia under a deal estimated at around ₹6,000 crore, marking one of New Delhi’s largest-ever surface-to-air missile export contracts. Beyond Armenia, several countries—including Vietnam, Egypt and the Philippines—have expressed formal interest in acquiring the Akash system. A potential $200 million Akash deal with the Philippines is currently in advanced discussions and is seen as India’s next marquee missile export after the BrahMos contract with Manila. With exports rising and New Delhi targeting ₹50,000 crore in annual defence exports by 2029, higher Akash throughput at BDL will be crucial in meeting both foreign orders and Indian armed forces’ replenishment needs. Industrial ecosystem and ‘Make in India’ push The Akash line is often highlighted as a flagship of India’s indigenous missile ecosystem: The system is over 90% indigenous by value, involving hundreds of Indian firms supplying everything from propulsion casings and seekers to launcher structures and radar components. Hyderabad has emerged as a key hub, with BDL’s main missile complexes working alongside Tata Advanced Systems, BEL, and numerous MSMEs that produce launchers, electronics and sub-systems. The decision to double monthly output is thus also a signal of confidence in the capacity of this domestic supply chain to sustain high-volume, high-complexity manufacturing over the long term. Strategic impact: thicker air shield for a contested neighbourhood For India’s planners, the jump from 50 to 100 Akash missiles per month translates directly into a thicker, faster-replenishing air-defence shield across key theatres: Along the Line of Control and western sector, the system enhances protection of critical infrastructure and troop concentrations against Pakistani aircraft, drones and stand-off munitions. On the northern front, additional regiments bolster defence against potential PLA Air Force incursions, complementing longer-range systems and upcoming projects such as Project Kusha, India’s indigenous S-400–class programme. Combined with the ongoing development of Akash-NG and other next-generation SAMs, BDL’s expanded Akash production line underscores a clear trend: India is moving from being an air-defence importer to an increasingly confident manufacturer and exporter of complex missile systems. As tensions simmer along contested borders and demand for affordable, combat-proven air-defence grows worldwide, the Akash missile—rolling out of BDL’s factories at nearly 100 rounds a month—is set to remain a central pillar of both India’s national security and its defence export strategy.
Read More → Posted on 2025-11-22 05:09:23
World
In a rapidly intensifying diplomatic confrontation, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has formally rejected former U.S. President Donald Trump’s proposed 28-point peace deal, a plan that would force Ukraine to surrender occupied territories to Russia in exchange for security guarantees. The refusal has sharpened tensions with Washington and set the stage for what Ukrainian officials warn may become the most difficult weeks of the Russia-Ukraine war. Trump Says Zelensky “Has No Options” Speaking to reporters, Trump insisted that Ukraine has little leverage left and must accept the deal or face consequences. “At some point he’s gonna have to accept something,” Trump said.“You remember right in the Oval Office I said, ‘You don’t have the cards.’”“If he doesn’t like the deal, then they can keep fighting, I guess.” Trump argues that the war should never have started and that “with the right president,” diplomacy would have prevented it entirely. U.S. officials around him have privately warned Kyiv that rejecting the plan may lead to reductions in intelligence support, military aid, and weapons supplies. Zelensky’s Firm Rejection: “Washington Already Received Its Answer” Zelensky has responded with unprecedented clarity, stating that Ukraine will not accept the U.S.-proposed peace agreement under any circumstances. He emphasized that Washington already knew Ukraine’s position years ago. In a powerful message to both Ukraine and international partners, Zelensky declared: “We will not accept the peace agreement proposed by the United States.”“Washington received its answer long ago—back on May 20, 2019—when I publicly vowed to defend Ukraine’s independence and sovereignty.” That oath, he said, remains unchanged despite battlefield pressures and diplomatic pressure from Washington. Europe Divides from Washington European governments have increasingly voiced discomfort with the U.S. plan, arguing that it was drafted without proper consultation and threatens to legitimize Russia’s aggression. Diplomats across the EU privately warn that forcing Kyiv into concessions would fracture Western unity and embolden Moscow. Moscow Welcomes the U.S. Proposal The Kremlin reacted positively, calling Trump’s proposal “a potential basis for negotiations.”But Russian officials warned that if Ukraine refuses, Russian forces will continue their offensive. President Putin remarked that the plan reflects “realistic conditions,” a signal that Moscow sees strategic advantage in the U.S.-drafted framework. Ukraine Faces Its Hardest Phase Yet On the battlefield, Ukraine is confronting severe challenges: intensified Russian attacks on energy systems ammunition shortages declining Western stockpiles and internal political strains Analysts warn that losing U.S. support at this moment could significantly shift the war’s momentum in Russia’s favour. A Defining Moment Kyiv is now preparing a counter-proposal centred on full sovereignty and territorial integrity, hoping to rally Europe into a unified front. But Washington has signalled that time is limited, and Trump’s circle insists the matter must be resolved swiftly. Ukraine faces a defining choice: enter negotiations on terms it considers unacceptable, or continue fighting with potentially reduced U.S. assistance. As one senior adviser in Kyiv noted: “The coming weeks will be the toughest in the history of this war.” If you’d like, I can add a detailed breakdown of the 28-point plan or include reactions from NATO and Eastern European governments.
Read More → Posted on 2025-11-22 04:53:27
World
In a landmark move for its defence posture, Japan has delivered its first export shipment of domestically produced Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) interceptor missiles to United States, marking the first time Tokyo has supplied finished air-defence missiles abroad under its freshly loosened export regulations. The Shipment and Its Significance On November 20, 2025, the Japanese government confirmed that it had completed the delivery of PAC-3 missiles manufactured under licence by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries to the U.S. military at Washington’s request. Tokyo clarified the missiles were drawn from Japan Air Self-Defense Force stocks and stressed they are headed only to U.S. forces. The transfer helps the U.S. replenish its missile-defence inventories, which have been heavily strained by commitments across Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific. The U.S. requested the shipment to maintain allied air-defence support, including assistance to Ukraine. Technical and Industrial Dimensions The PAC-3 interceptor — particularly the MSE (Missile Segment Enhancement) variant — uses a hit-to-kill concept featuring an active Ka-band radar seeker that destroys incoming threats through direct impact. The dual-pulse solid rocket motor and enlarged control surfaces nearly double the defended footprint, expanding range and intercept altitude beyond earlier models. The interceptors are produced by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries under licence from Lockheed Martin. Japan’s annual production capacity is around 30 missiles, with potential expansion once critical components like Boeing-built seekers become more available. Shift in Japan’s Defence Export Policy The transfer marks a historic departure from Japan’s long-standing restrictions on exporting lethal defence equipment. Until recently, Japan’s policies prevented exporting complete weapons produced under foreign licence. By approving the PAC-3 shipment to the U.S., Tokyo signals its willingness to join allied defence supply chains and play a more proactive role in regional deterrence. The export aligns with Japan’s 2022 National Security Strategy, which identifies China’s military rise and North Korea’s missile developments as major threats. Geostrategic and Diplomatic Implications For the United States, the delivery provides critical relief for strained missile-defence stockpiles and supports broader global commitments. It also reinforces Japan’s value as a key industrial partner in alliance defence planning. Japan’s move, however, has drawn criticism from China. Beijing argues that Japan is abandoning its pacifist stance and becoming more deeply embedded in U.S. containment strategies in the Western Pacific. Next Steps and Challenges Japan has not disclosed the exact number of missiles shipped or the delivery timeline. Both nations still face supply-chain bottlenecks, especially involving high-technology components. Washington continues to encourage Japan to expand joint missile production and deepen industrial cooperation, with the PAC-3 export potentially serving as the first step in wider co-production efforts. Japan’s export of domestically built PAC-3 interceptors to the United States marks a major strategic milestone. The move strengthens U.S. missile-defence capabilities while signaling Japan’s evolution into a more assertive security actor. As great-power competition intensifies in the Indo-Pacific, the transfer carries both symbolic weight and practical impact.
Read More → Posted on 2025-11-21 17:27:13
World
Spanish shipbuilder Navantia has formally showcased its ALPHA-3000 multi-mission frigate at Defense & Security 2025 in Bangkok, presenting a flexible, modular warship concept aimed squarely at the Royal Thai Navy (RTN)—despite no official Request for Proposal (RFP) being issued yet. The company is promoting the platform as a future-ready frigate capable of countering emerging threats, especially drones, while offering deep technology-transfer options to support Thailand’s long-term naval modernization. Modular Architecture and Thai Industry Integration At the heart of the ALPHA-3000 concept is its open-architecture design, built to adapt to shifting operational needs. The ship is centered on Navantia’s next-generation CATIZ (Combat System Integrado de Navantia) combat management system, designed to integrate sensors, weapons, radars, and electronic warfare suites sourced from any international supplier. Navantia officials emphasized that the frigate’s architecture allows Thailand to tailor weapon systems, radar suites, and indigenous technologies once RTN publishes its formal requirements. The Spanish shipbuilder also reiterated its readiness for technology transfer (ToT), local production, and long-term industrial support—an offer that aligns with Thailand’s broader ambition to boost domestic shipbuilding and reduce dependency on foreign suppliers. Navantia’s long relationship with Thailand also strengthens its bid. The company built Thailand’s sole aircraft carrier, HTMS Chakri Naruebet, and recently won a contract to upgrade the navy’s two Pattani-class offshore patrol vessels. Navantia will also supply CATIZ CMS and the DORNA Fire Control System for the Chinese-built LPD HTMS Chang. Defense analysts note that this existing footprint gives Navantia a significant advantage over competitors entering the market for the first time. Counter-UAS as a Core Design Priority While most frigate designs in the region emphasize anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare, the ALPHA-3000 breaks new ground with counter-drone warfare integrated as a primary design driver. According to company officials, this focus was not requested by Thailand, but shaped by battlefield lessons from Ukraine, Gaza, and the Red Sea, where drones—especially FPV (First-Person View) kamikaze drones—have become a defining naval threat. Indra’s CROW EW Suite at the Center Navantia has equipped the ALPHA-3000 with Indra’s CROW electronic warfare system, a multi-sensor drone-defense suite originally created for land systems and adapted for naval use just within the last year. Features include: RF detection and direction-finding Multi-band radar detection Electro-optical/infrared tracking GNSS and RF datalink jamming Centralized threat fusion via CATIZ CMS Two Spanish Navy ships have already operated demo units for nine months, giving CROW early operational maturity compared with competing systems. Kinetic Defense: Millennium CIWS Complementing the EW suite is the 35mm Oerlikon Millennium Gun, firing AHEAD airburst ammunition tailored for small, fast-moving drones and swarm attacks. The main radar is Leonardo’s Kronos AESA, selected specifically for its ability to detect small, slow-moving airborne objects. Naval analysts say this configuration gives ALPHA-3000 one of the region’s first fully integrated C-UAS solutions on a frigate-size vessel—a capability RTN has publicly acknowledged it needs to strengthen. Specifications and Armament Profile The ALPHA-3000 is sized as a mid-weight, blue-water capable frigate designed for multi-domain operations. Key Specifications Length: 104 m Beam: 14.4 m Displacement: ~3,000 tonnes Speed: 27 knots Range: 5,000 nautical miles Endurance: 20+ days Sea State Operations: 5/6 (hull), 4 (helicopter ops) Crew: 102 (124 accommodation capacity) Weapons Suite 16-cell VLS for SAMs Exocet MM40 Block 3 anti-ship missiles 76mm main gun Millennium CIWS 2× triple torpedo tubes Flight deck & hangar for 11-ton helicopter + UAV facilities Propulsion CODAD configuration Four 5,920 kW diesel engines Two CPP shafts Proven Lineage and Regional Momentum The ALPHA-3000 is based on Navantia’s globally successful family of medium warships. The AVANTE-2200 corvettes, a lighter predecessor, are already in service with the Royal Saudi Naval Forces, demonstrating the ship’s adaptability and export viability. Navantia had also pitched variants to Australia’s SEA 3000 GP frigate program, showing its willingness to redesign mast structures, weapon fits, and propulsion layouts per customer requirements. Why Navantia Believes Thailand is a Perfect Fit Navantia officials argue that Thailand, operating in an increasingly drone-threatened maritime environment, will eventually require a frigate that blends traditional capabilities with robust counter-UAS defenses. The RTN has already highlighted challenges posed by UAVs during patrols in the Andaman Sea and the Gulf of Thailand. Defense observers also point to: Thailand’s effort to replace aging Type 053HT frigates, Ongoing modernization after the Chinese-built S26T submarine delays, RTN’s desire to diversify suppliers beyond China, Bangkok’s push for local defense production partnerships. The combination of proven design, counter-drone integration, and existing Thai-Spanish naval ties positions Navantia as a front-runner whenever Thailand issues its formal frigate RFP. A Frigate Designed for Tomorrow’s Threats The ALPHA-3000 underscores a broader shift in naval strategy: modern frigates must now defend against not only missiles and submarines, but small drones, loitering munitions, and unmanned swarms—threats that have reshaped maritime warfare in just three years. Whether the Royal Thai Navy agrees with this vision will become clear once requirements are published. For now, Navantia is betting that future conflicts—and current lessons—will define Thailand’s next-generation frigate.
Read More → Posted on 2025-11-21 17:05:56
World
Austin, Texas – Texas Governor Greg Abbott has escalated his campaign against what he calls “Sharia courts” in the state, ordering the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) and local prosecutors to investigate Muslim mediation bodies in the Dallas area and elsewhere in Texas. The move comes just days after Abbott also designated the Muslim Brotherhood and the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) as “foreign terrorist and transnational criminal organizations” under Texas law – a step legal experts say has no force under federal terrorism statutes but carries major political and civil-rights implications. Abbott vows to “root out” Sharia tribunals In a message amplified on conservative media and social platforms, Abbott declared that “at least two Sharia courts” are operating in the Dallas area and said he is deploying DPS to “root out any Sharia courts anywhere in the state of Texas.” Posts circulating online closely track language in a formal governor’s letter sent this week to North Texas district attorneys, sheriffs, the Texas Attorney General and DPS, urging investigations into “Sharia tribunals masquerading as legal courts.” Abbott has repeatedly argued that the Texas Constitution and state statutes do not permit Sharia law to be enforced in place of U.S. or Texas law. In 2017, Texas enacted House Bill 45, often described as an “anti-Sharia law” measure, barring state courts from enforcing foreign legal codes that conflict with constitutional rights. More recently, Abbott signed a 2025 law targeting what he labeled “Sharia compounds,” after attacking EPIC City, a proposed Muslim-centered community near Dallas, as an alleged attempt to create an enclave governed by Islamic rules – a claim developers have strongly denied. “Our statutes have banned Sharia law, and we will purge any attempt to impose it in Texas,” Abbott said in comments promoted by his supporters. What are these “Sharia courts” in Texas? At the center of Abbott’s latest offensive are Islamic mediation services in North Texas – sometimes described by critics as “Sharia courts” but by organizers as voluntary forums for religious arbitration on family and civil disputes, similar to long-standing Jewish Beth Din or Christian arbitration panels used around the United States. Under U.S. law, parties can agree to settle certain civil disputes – such as business disagreements or some family matters – through private arbitration, including religious bodies. However, any decision still depends on enforcement by secular courts, which must reject outcomes that violate constitutional protections or public policy. Legal scholars note that this framework has long applied to Jewish and Christian tribunals and, more recently, to some Muslim arbitration panels. Critics of Abbott say his framing of these bodies as illegal “courts” misleads the public about how they actually operate and feeds suspicion of ordinary Muslim religious practice. Muslim groups call move “Islamophobic,” launch lawsuits Abbott’s actions have triggered immediate backlash from CAIR and other Muslim organizations. Multiple CAIR chapters in Texas have filed suit against the governor and Attorney General Ken Paxton, arguing that labeling CAIR a “foreign terrorist organization” and ordering DPS investigations is unconstitutional discrimination based on religion and political viewpoint. CAIR, a U.S. civil-rights group that frequently sues over anti-Muslim discrimination, says it has never been designated a terrorist entity by the federal government and regularly condemns terrorism and political violence. It accuses Abbott of stoking anti-Muslim hate for electoral gain and warns that the “Sharia courts” rhetoric could further endanger mosques and Muslim communities in Texas. Civil-liberties advocates and some legal experts add that while states can regulate fraud, unauthorized legal practice and criminal conduct, they cannot outlaw a religion’s internal rules or selectively target one faith’s arbitration practices while permitting others. How large is Islam in the U.S. – and in Texas? Despite the heated rhetoric, Muslims remain a very small minority in the United States: Nationally, Muslims account for roughly 1–1.3% of the U.S. population – around 3.5 to 4.5 million people – making Islam the third-largest religion after Christianity and Judaism. A 2025 estimate suggests about 4 million Muslims, or roughly 1.2% of Americans, with concentrations in major urban areas such as New York, Chicago, Detroit, Houston and Dallas. In Texas, cities like Houston and Dallas–Fort Worth have seen visible growth in mosques, Islamic schools and halal businesses, reflecting broader immigration trends and the fact that about 40–45% of U.S. Muslims are now U.S.-born citizens. Researchers point out that, in demographic terms, there is no realistic pathway for any religious minority, including Muslims, to impose a parallel legal system that could replace constitutional democracy in the United States. Is Islam or “Sharia law” a threat to American democracy? Supporters of Abbott argue that even small networks that promote strict interpretations of Sharia could, over time, undermine equal rights for women, LGBTQ+ people or religious minorities if allowed to operate without scrutiny. They also point to extremist organizations abroad that invoke Islamic law as a justification for violence and repression, arguing that Western democracies must be vigilant against similar ideologies gaining footholds at home. However, constitutional scholars and mainstream security experts counter several key points: U.S. courts are bound by the Constitution, not religious law. Any attempt to enforce a religious rule that violates due process, equal protection or basic rights is void. Faith-based arbitration is not unique to Islam; Jewish and Christian tribunals have operated for decades without being portrayed as existential threats to democracy. Most American Muslims express strong support for democratic values and religious freedom, and surveys show they are about as likely as other Americans to believe in the “American dream” and to participate in civic life. National security analysts caution that framing Islam itself – rather than specific violent groups – as a “biggest threat” risks fueling radicalization and hate crimes, while diverting attention from empirically documented threats such as far-right extremism, white supremacist violence, and other domestic terrorism trends identified by federal agencies. Political stakes for Abbott – and for U.S. debates on religion and law Abbott’s offensive against alleged Sharia courts and his unilateral designation of CAIR and the Muslim Brotherhood as terrorist entities come as he seeks to energize conservative voters ahead of future statewide and national political contests. The campaign dovetails with his high-profile clashes with the Biden administration over immigration, border security and culture-war issues. For supporters, the governor is defending American and Texan law against what they see as creeping “foreign” legal norms. For critics, he is weaponizing fear of Islam to expand state powers, restrict property rights and chill the activities of Muslim civil-rights organizations. What is clear is that no parallel Islamic legal system can replace constitutional courts in Texas or anywhere else in the United States. The unfolding clash is less about an imminent legal takeover and more about how a pluralistic democracy manages religious diversity, protects civil rights and responds to concerns about extremism—without turning an entire faith community into a political enemy.
Read More → Posted on 2025-11-21 16:57:39Search
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