Why Bilawal Bhutto’s Offer to Hand Over Hafiz Saeed and Masood Azhar Is a Diplomatic Mirage

Pakistan’s former foreign minister, Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, recently made headlines by declaring that Islamabad is open to extraditing Hafiz Saeed and Masood Azhar—two of India’s most wanted terror suspects—to New Delhi. On the surface, this appeared to be a dramatic shift in Pakistan's long-standing reluctance to act against terrorists wanted for deadly attacks on Indian soil. But on closer examination, the offer looks less like a bold policy decision and more like a hollow diplomatic bluff.

Bilawal's offer came with conditions: India must first "cooperate" by providing evidence and witnesses for ongoing legal proceedings in Pakistan. While that sounds reasonable in theory, it ignores the extensive legal and diplomatic steps India has already taken over the years. For instance, after the 2008 Mumbai attacks, India submitted over 1,000 pages of dossiers detailing Hafiz Saeed's direct role as the mastermind. Despite this, the Pakistani judicial process has dragged on for over a decade without a single conviction tied directly to the attacks.

Hafiz Saeed, the founder of Lashkar-e-Taiba, is currently serving a 33-year sentence in Pakistan—not for 26/11, but for terror financing. His confinement is widely viewed as symbolic. Many reports from intelligence agencies and independent observers have claimed to spot him freely attending religious and political gatherings under heavy security. Meanwhile, Masood Azhar, the founder of Jaish-e-Mohammad and the man India holds responsible for the 2016 Pathankot airbase attack, is supposedly untraceable. Pakistan claims he is in Afghanistan, a claim that lacks evidence and is rejected by Indian security agencies.

What makes Bilawal Bhutto's statement particularly hollow is his current political irrelevance. As of now, he holds no government office or executive authority in Pakistan. Any serious offer on extradition must come from the sitting government or be backed by the powerful Pakistani military establishment, which historically has wielded major control over the country’s India policy and counterterrorism approach. Bilawal’s comments seem more like a diplomatic trial balloon—testing the waters or attempting to show a moderate face without any real commitment.

Historically, Pakistan’s credibility on such matters has been dismal. The country has consistently dodged international pressure when it comes to dismantling terror networks operating from its soil. Both Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad are officially banned in Pakistan as per the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA), but these bans often exist only on paper. Their operations frequently continue under different names, and their leadership enjoys a level of protection that raises questions about the state’s complicity or at least its tolerance.

India’s frustration is rooted in decades of similar tactics. Whether it was the delayed response after the 2001 Parliament attack or the lack of follow-through after Pathankot and Pulwama, Pakistan has repeatedly avoided accountability by using legal technicalities and bureaucratic inertia. Offers of cooperation are often coupled with shifting blame, and procedural delays are used to shield terrorists from real justice.

The timing of Bilawal’s comments is also suspect. They come right after India suspended the Indus Waters Treaty, a move that carries serious implications for Pakistan’s water security. It’s no coincidence that this peace overture follows such a setback. Many analysts believe the offer is less about justice and more about damage control—an effort to soften international scrutiny and possibly reopen stalled diplomatic channels.

Technically, extradition between India and Pakistan is a complex issue. The two countries do not have a formal extradition treaty, making any transfer of accused individuals legally difficult even if political will exists. Moreover, Pakistan’s legal framework focuses primarily on offenses committed within its own borders, such as terror financing, rather than cross-border attacks, limiting its ability—or willingness—to prosecute Saeed or Azhar for their roles in terrorism against India.

To add another layer of irony, Bhutto blamed India for the lack of progress in these cases, alleging non-cooperation in terms of witness testimony. However, Indian officials insist they have offered to facilitate virtual testimony, which Pakistan has routinely rejected on procedural grounds. This back-and-forth has become a cycle of mutual accusations that effectively stalls justice.

Bilawal Bhutto Zardari’s recent offer to extradite Hafiz Saeed and Masood Azhar sounds conciliatory but lacks any real substance. With no formal power, no military backing, and no change in ground realities, his statements are unlikely to translate into action. Given Pakistan’s long history of insincerity, strategic denial, and judicial inaction on terror cases, the offer is viewed in India and among global observers as little more than a diplomatic distraction. Without concrete steps, genuine arrests, and transparent legal proceedings, such overtures will continue to be dismissed as empty rhetoric dressed in the language of peace.