US loan for Reko Diq, Trump’s “massive oil” talk and what Pakistan actually has underground

How a $100 million loan request, political posturing and old energy data collided — and why Pakistan is not suddenly an oil giant

Pakistan’s Reko Diq project — a long-running, high-stakes copper–gold development in Balochistan — has applied for a loan of just over $100 million from the U.S. Export-Import (EXIM) Bank to help build an open-pit mine, processing plants, power and transport infrastructure. The application was framed as another step in drawing Western capital into Pakistan’s resource sector.

That news arrived against a noisier backdrop: high-profile U.S. statements and tweets this summer suggesting America would help Pakistan exploit “massive” oil reserves. The contrast between the rhetoric and the facts on the ground has renewed debate about what Pakistan really has beneath its soil — and what foreign lenders can realistically expect to recover.

What is the Reko Diq request about?

Reko Diq is primarily a copper-gold deposit, not an oil field. The $100M+ loan application to the U.S. EXIM Bank is aimed at developing the mine’s surface operations, processing facilities, power supply and the logistics needed to move ore and concentrate — the kind of upfront capital projects that can make a large mining project viable but also expose lenders to political and security risks in Balochistan.

Who sounded the alarm — and why?

Evan (Evan A.) Feigenbaum, a former U.S. Treasury official and long-time observer of South Asia, used pointed language on social media to warn that U.S. involvement could repeat some of China’s expensive lessons with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). He quipped that “the US can attempt to lose nearly as much money as China has lost on CPEC,” highlighting the political, security and commercial risks of heavy infrastructure and resource bets in Pakistan.

The oil numbers — small, messy, often misunderstood

Multiple energy databases and recent reporting make the same basic point: Pakistan does not have large, proven conventional oil reserves in the way oil exporters like Saudi Arabia or even neighboring India appear to. Proven conventional crude oil reserves for Pakistan are generally reported in the range of about 234 million to 353 million barrels — a modest figure internationally that places Pakistan well down the global rankings. By contrast, India’s proven reserves are commonly cited around 4.8–5.0 billion barrels, many times larger. Those comparative figures have been used repeatedly in recent articles that question claims of “massive” Pakistani oil.

Two important qualifiers, though:

1. Proven vs. technically recoverable: Proven reserves are what has been demonstrated and can be produced economically today. Separate from that, past technical studies have suggested that Pakistan could hold a much larger volume of technically recoverable shale oil — figures sometimes cited in the billions of barrels. Those shale estimates are not the same as proven, commercial reserves and would require enormous investment and new technologies to produce.

2. Exploration track record: Pakistan has had several high-cost, low-yield exploration efforts, including offshore attempts that failed to turn into commercial fields. Political instability, security issues in provinces like Balochistan, and infrastructure gaps have historically dampened investor appetite.

So — is there a geopolitical play here?

Yes. Public announcements and high-visibility deals serve multiple purposes beyond immediate economics: they can be diplomatic signals, attempts to attract strategic partners (and capital), and even bargaining chips in broader trade or political negotiations. The Reko Diq loan request, the public U.S. posture on Pakistani energy, and the social-media barbs from analysts like Feigenbaum should be read partly as pieces of that political theatre — but they also expose real risks for any lender or developer who underestimates local politics, security, or the technical difficulty of extracting resources.