Taiwan Unveils 8 kW Laser Weapon to Counter Drone Threats

Taiwan’s Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation (AIDC) has unveiled an 8-kilowatt fiber-optic LASER system at the Taipei Aerospace & Defense Technology Exhibition. The compact, truck-mounted weapon strengthens the island’s asymmetric defence posture against small unmanned aerial systems (UAS) by offering a low-cost way to detect, track and disable hostile drones at short to medium ranges. While the system is a clear technical advance, it is important to understand both what it can realistically do and where its limits lie.

The weapon is a solid-state fiber laser that emits near 1.07 micrometers, a wavelength chosen because it performs relatively well in humid coastal air. The complete package weighs under 500 kilograms and is designed to mount on a standard five-ton truck, making it road-mobile across Taiwan’s crowded terrain. In constrained trials the beam can be focused to roughly a 10-centimetre spot at 1 kilometre with under two milliradians of spread, allowing concentrated energy delivery on small targets. Under test conditions the laser required up to about five seconds of sustained heating — or dwell time — to induce structural failure on Group-2 quadcopters (those under about 25 kilograms). Simulations shared by developers indicate a high probability of success against individual, non-maneuvering quadcopters: roughly 90 percent at 1.5 kilometres and somewhat lower effectiveness against aggressive, maneuvering swarms.

Sensors and fire control are integral to the system. A mid-wave infrared (IR) camera provides visual cueing and can pick out small drones out to several kilometres in clear conditions, while a Ku-band radar tracks many objects in a sizeable surveillance bubble and cues a gimbal-mounted beam director with adaptive optics to stabilize the shot in turbulent air. Processing runs on commercial off-the-shelf cores with low latency. Power is supplied by a portable diesel generator and thermal loads are handled by a liquid cooling circuit. For safety and regulatory reasons, current live trials are being conducted at limited ranges (around 150 metres), but the system is designed to operate at 1–2 kilometres in suitable conditions, and the company aims to scale the design to about 12 kilowatts in the next development phase.

Technically, the system’s strengths are clear: low marginal cost per engagement, mobility, and sensor fusion that improves detection and targeting. A laser’s cost per shot is mainly energy and wear on components and so is dramatically lower than interceptor missiles, making lasers attractive for economically addressing low-value threats without expending expensive kinetic interceptors. Mounted on a truck, such a system can be redeployed to protect critical infrastructure, forward positions or choke points as needed.

Yet practical limits are equally important. Optical weapons suffer from atmospheric effects: humidity, haze, rain and typhoons common in Taiwan’s climate degrade optical propagation, increase required dwell time, and reduce effective range. Urban density and safety constraints also limit opportunities for long-range high-power testing on land, forcing many trials offshore or at night and slowing realistic evaluations. Most critically, lasers engage targets sequentially and need measurable dwell time on each target; even with fast reacquisition, one emitter can only defeat a limited number of targets per minute. Against large, coordinated swarms that send dozens or hundreds of drones from multiple vectors, a small set of lasers can be overwhelmed unless deployed in numbers or supported by other measures.

This numerical vulnerability is amplified by attacker production capacity. According to a report, China’s industry can produce at least ~3.17 million civilian drones per year, a scale that highlights how an opponent with vast manufacturing and logistical resources can field massed swarms or sacrificial units to saturate point defences. In such a contest, relying on single-beam lasers alone risks being outpaced by sheer numbers and redundancy tactics; defenders must either scale defensive systems to match throughput, deny the attacker mass launch capability, or accept attrition.

Given these realities, the most prudent posture for Taiwan is to treat systems like AIDC’s 8 kW LASER as one layer in a broader, integrated air-defence architecture rather than as a standalone solution. That means accelerating production so multiple laser units provide overlapping coverage; pairing lasers with electronic warfare measures that jam or spoof drone guidance; retaining kinetic interceptors for high-value threats; investing in automation and distributed fire control so multiple beams can be cued quickly across many targets; and conducting realistic, high-tempo mass-engagement testing to measure true throughput and logistical costs.

Strategically, lasers fit well into Taiwan’s asymmetric approach: they are low cost, mobile and scalable, and are particularly useful for defending fixed points or thinning out attacker swarms before higher-cost interceptors are used. But against a near-peer adversary with the capacity to mass-produce inexpensive drones and launch multi-axis swarms, lasers must be integrated into layered, networked defences and supported by production scale, sensor depth, electronic attack and active counter-launch measures.

In short, the AIDC 8 kW LASER is a practical and welcome addition to Taiwan’s toolkit. It sharpens the island’s ability to deal with everyday UAS threats at low cost. Yet it will only reach its full defensive value if Taipei treats it as one component of a layered strategy, invests in realistic mass-engagement testing, and scales both production and complementary technologies to blunt the numerical advantages of a large adversary.