Saudi Arabia Issues 24-Hour Ultimatum to UAE Over Yemen, Forcing Pakistan Into a Strategic Dilemma

A sharp and unusual public rupture has erupted between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) after a Saudi-led coalition airstrike hit Yemen’s southern port city of Mukalla on Tuesday, December 30, 2025, targeting what Riyadh said was an unauthorised weapons and armored-vehicle shipment linked to UAE-backed southern separatists.

According to Reuters and AP, Saudi Arabia framed the incident as a direct national security issue, warning that its security is a “red line” and accusing Abu Dhabi—implicitly and then more directly—of actions that could destabilise the anti-Houthi coalition from within. The strike followed reports of two Emirati ships arriving and unloading cargo that Saudi officials said was destined for the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a powerful separatist movement backed by the UAE. The UAE denied the core allegation, saying it had sent vehicles for its own forces and urged restraint. 

The “24-Hour” Ultimatum—and a Wider Clampdown

The most dramatic escalation came with a 24-hour demand for UAE forces to withdraw from Yemen, issued amid the crisis by the Saudi side and echoed through Yemen’s Saudi-aligned political leadership. Reuters reported that Yemen’s presidential council head, Rashad al-Alimi, cancelled a defence pact with the UAE and accused Abu Dhabi of fuelling internal conflict by empowering the STC.

The fallout quickly expanded beyond rhetoric. Reuters reported a 72-hour no-fly zone and a widening ground and sea blockade across Yemeni entry points, underscoring how rapidly the dispute has shifted from political friction to operational pressure. Separate reporting also described emergency measures around Mukalla following the strikes.

Why Mukalla Matters: Yemen’s Fractured Anti-Houthi Front

Mukalla sits in Yemen’s south, where the war is not just a fight between the Iran-aligned Houthis and the internationally recognised government, but a multi-layered contest among rival anti-Houthi factions. The UAE’s long backing of the STC has repeatedly clashed with Saudi preferences for a unified, Saudi-aligned Yemeni government structure. This week’s escalation is being read by diplomats and analysts as a moment when those contradictions have broken into the open—potentially handing the Houthis a strategic advantage if the anti-Houthi coalition fractures further.

If Riyadh and Abu Dhabi Clash, Where Does Pakistan Stand?

The Saudi–UAE crisis lands uncomfortably in Islamabad because Pakistan is deeply tied to both capitals, but in different ways—security with Saudi Arabia and financial stabilisation with the UAE, alongside broader Gulf links.

Pakistan’s defence relationship with Riyadh has been reinforced recently by a reported Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA) signed on September 17, 2025, formalising long-standing military cooperation and signalling that Saudi Arabia views Pakistan as a core security partner.

At the same time, the UAE remains a crucial economic backer at moments of acute pressure. Pakistan’s central bank confirmed the UAE rolled over $2 billion in deposits—two $1 billion placements—for another year in January 2025, providing immediate breathing room for Pakistan’s reserves and debt calendar.

Islamabad has also pursued wider Emirati economic engagement. Reuters previously reported Pakistan’s prime minister’s office said the UAE had committed $10 billion in investments (with sector details not fully specified at the time), highlighting how Pakistan sees Abu Dhabi not only as a lender but as a potential long-term investor.

The Likely Pakistani Playbook: Quiet Diplomacy, No Public “Pick a Side”

Given the stakes, Pakistan is unlikely to publicly choose one partner over the other—at least in the near term. Instead, Islamabad’s most realistic strategy is to lean on three familiar tools.

First, silence and caution: Pakistan typically avoids amplifying intra-Gulf disputes in public statements, particularly when both sides are essential for external financing and migrant-worker remittances.

Second, back-channel reassurance: Pakistan can privately reassure Riyadh that existing defence cooperation remains intact—especially under the post-2025 framework—while simultaneously signalling to Abu Dhabi that Pakistan’s economic partnership and investment facilitation remain separate from Gulf political rivalries.

Third, multilateral cover: If the Saudi–UAE rift widens, Pakistan may prefer to position itself behind broader calls for de-escalation—through the UN or regional diplomacy—rather than bilateral alignment that could jeopardise either defence cooperation with Saudi Arabia or vital financial rollovers from the UAE.

What Happens Next: A Test of Gulf Cohesion—and Pakistan’s Crisis Diplomacy

The immediate question is whether the 24-hour withdrawal demand becomes a stepping stone to negotiation—or a trigger for escalation at sea and in the air around southern Yemen’s ports. The broader question is whether this dispute remains contained to Yemen, or spills into other theatres where Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have diverging interests.

For Pakistan, the risk is not only diplomatic embarrassment but material: any prolonged Saudi–UAE confrontation could complicate the very debt rollovers, reserve support, and investment flows that Pakistan relies on to stay afloat—while simultaneously testing the durability of its deepening security alignment with Riyadh.