Rare Images Show North Korea Mass-Producing Two Hwasong-11 Missile Variants for Domestic Use and Russia Transfers

North Korean state media has released exceptionally rare images from inside a ballistic-missile manufacturing facility, offering one of the clearest open-source views yet of the country’s industrial-scale solid-fuel missile production. The photographs, published by Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), show long rows of Hwasong-11 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) under assembly as Kim Jong Un toured the plant.

Mirrored by independent monitoring platforms, the imagery provides unusually detailed insight into North Korea’s missile manufacturing throughput, and appears to confirm that two different Hwasong-11 variants are being produced in parallel. The disclosure carries added weight given that missiles from this family have been exported to Russia since 2023 and used in the war in Ukraine, marking a significant intersection between East Asian missile proliferation and European security.

An Unprecedented Look Inside a Strategic Facility

North Korea almost never releases photographs from inside sensitive weapons plants. In this instance, KCNA published multiple high-resolution images showing dozens of missile airframes at different stages of assembly, arranged in orderly, parallel production lines. The visible use of jigs, transport cradles, and climate-controlled interiors suggests a standardized, repeatable manufacturing process, rather than limited or experimental output.

The missiles shown match the dimensions, nose-cone shapes, and control-surface layouts of operational Hwasong-11 systems previously flight-tested and deployed by the Korean People’s Army, indicating that the images depict combat-ready hardware, not display models.

Parallel Production of Two Hwasong-11 Variants

Analysis of the imagery indicates simultaneous production of at least two distinct configurations within the Hwasong-11 family:

Hwasong-11A (KN-23) — A solid-fuel, quasi-ballistic SRBM broadly comparable in concept to Russia’s Iskander-M. The KN-23 follows a depressed, maneuvering trajectory, designed to complicate interception by missile-defense systems. It is assessed to have a range of approximately 450–600 kilometers, depending on payload, and can carry a conventional or nuclear warhead estimated at up to 500 kilograms.

Hwasong-11B (KN-24) — A shorter-range but more precision-optimized SRBM, believed to have a maximum range of around 400 kilometers. The KN-24 features an advanced guidance package, reportedly achieving high accuracy suitable for counter-force and hardened targets. Visual differences in fuselage length and nose design visible in the factory images align with known KN-24 characteristics.

The presence of both variants on the assembly floor strongly suggests a modular production system, allowing North Korea to scale output of different missile types based on operational requirements or export demand.

Technical Characteristics

Across the Hwasong-11 series, several defining features stand out. All variants use solid propellant, enabling rapid launch readiness with minimal pre-launch preparation. The missiles are deployed on road-mobile transporter-erector-launchers (TELs), enhancing survivability against pre-emptive strikes. Open-source assessments estimate a circular error probable (CEP) in the tens of meters, a substantial improvement over earlier North Korean SRBMs.

Exports to Russia and Use in Ukraine Since 2023

Western intelligence agencies and independent analysts confirmed in 2023 that North Korea began transferring Hwasong-11 missiles to Russia. By late 2023 and into 2024, debris recovered from strike sites in Ukraine was identified as matching KN-23 and KN-24 components, confirming their combat use.

This marked the first documented use of North Korean ballistic missiles in an active European conflict. The factory images released in December 2025 suggest that Pyongyang is not relying solely on legacy stockpiles, but has established a sustained production pipeline capable of supporting both domestic force expansion and continued foreign supply.

Strategic and Security Implications

For North Korea, the imagery serves as a signal that its missile program has matured into a high-volume, industrial enterprise. For Russia, North Korean SRBMs provide a supplementary source of precision strike weapons amid sanctions and ongoing battlefield demand. For Europe, the development underscores how Asian missile proliferation is now directly influencing the security environment of the NATO theater.

In East Asia, the implications are equally stark. Large-scale production of solid-fuel SRBMs shortens warning times for South Korea and Japan and increases the challenge of missile-defense saturation in a crisis.

A Calculated Disclosure

While the release was likely intended as a demonstration of strength, it has also given analysts an unusually rich open-source intelligence snapshot. The scale of production, the parallel assembly of multiple variants, and the evident manufacturing maturity collectively point to a clear conclusion: North Korea’s ballistic-missile program has moved beyond testing and signaling into sustained, export-capable production.

In revealing its assembly lines, Pyongyang has sent a message that resonates far beyond the Korean Peninsula — one now felt on battlefields thousands of kilometers away.