India’s Unofficial Offer of Long-Range Cruise Missiles to Greece Could Shift Power Balance in Eastern Mediterranean

In a quiet but potentially groundbreaking move, India has unofficially offered its Long-Range Land Attack Cruise Missile (LRLACM) to Greece, in a deal that, if realized, could shift the strategic balance in the Eastern Mediterranean. While neither government has formally acknowledged the offer, defense analysts familiar with the development believe this move signals a calculated deepening of Indo-Greek defense cooperation, driven by mutual concerns over regional stability and adversarial posturing—particularly from Turkey.

Unlike the BrahMos missile, which is known for its supersonic speed, the LRLACM is a subsonic cruise missile with significantly longer reach—between 1,000 to 1,500 kilometers. Based on the technology foundation laid by India’s Nirbhay cruise missile program, the LRLACM has been designed for precision deep-strike missions, capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads.

The missile is a product of India’s Aeronautical Development Establishment (ADE), under DRDO, and represents a Mission Mode Project approved by the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC). Built in collaboration with major defense industry players like Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL) and Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL), it is tailored to evade enemy radar by flying low and hugging terrain contours. Its 6-meter length, one-tonne weight, and compact diameter of 0.52 meters make it compatible with various mobile and ship-based platforms.

From a tactical standpoint, the LRLACM is India’s answer to the U.S. Tomahawk and Russia’s Kalibr cruise missiles—long-range, terrain-hugging, stealth-capable, and relatively cost-effective. Its quiet subsonic profile makes it difficult for adversaries to detect in time, especially when launched in saturation salvos. Such features make it highly desirable for a country like Greece, which is looking to expand its precision-strike arsenal amid rising tensions with Turkey.

Greece's ongoing defense rivalry with Turkey—particularly over disputed maritime boundaries, airspace violations in the Aegean, and competing claims in the Eastern Mediterranean—has pushed Athens to modernize its armed forces. The acquisition of Rafale fighter jets, French Belharra frigates, and talks for advanced munitions form part of this broader strategic recalibration. A missile like the LRLACM would significantly increase Greece's strategic depth, giving it the ability to strike military installations, radar facilities, and logistics hubs deep within Turkish territory—without crossing into enemy airspace.

For India, the unofficial missile offer is about far more than just arms exports. It serves as an indirect geopolitical message to Ankara, which in recent years has increased military and diplomatic support for Pakistan, including joint defense projects and open backing on international platforms. By offering strategic weaponry to Greece, India is responding asymmetrically—arming Turkey’s rival in much the same way that Ankara has aligned with Islamabad.

This is a subtle but sophisticated way for New Delhi to apply pressure on Turkey without direct confrontation. It also aligns with India’s rising ambition to become a global defense exporter and a player in the European security space. With successful exports like the BrahMos to the Philippines and artillery systems to Armenia, the LRLACM could be the next chapter in India’s outward defense diplomacy.

While the missile has not yet been inducted in large numbers into the Indian armed forces, its technological maturity is progressing swiftly, with multiple successful flight trials already conducted. If Greece does move forward with the acquisition—either through government-to-government discussions or through a larger NATO-aligned framework—it would mark the first export of an Indian-developed long-range cruise missile to Europe.

There are political and logistical hurdles, of course. Greece, being a NATO member, must ensure compatibility with its allies and weigh the optics of procuring non-NATO-origin systems. But India's recent strategic convergence with France—a key defense supplier to both India and Greece—could help smooth these considerations.

In conclusion, while the offer remains unofficial, it reflects a new, more assertive Indian foreign policy—one that doesn't hesitate to counter adversaries by supporting their regional rivals. For Greece, it represents an opportunity to enhance long-range deterrence with a combat-proven system that fits its threat landscape perfectly. And for the broader Eastern Mediterranean, it introduces a new variable into an already volatile equation.