How India Obliterated Pakistan’s Underground C4I Facility at Nur Khan Airbase During Operation Sindoor
In a rare display of surgical precision and strategic dominance, the Indian Air Force (IAF), under Operation Sindoor, conducted a covert yet devastating strike on one of Pakistan's most secure and secretive underground C4I (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence) nodes located within the Nur Khan Airbase (formerly Chaklala Airbase) in Islamabad. This unprecedented operation destroyed what was considered the crown jewel of Pakistan’s air defence infrastructure, constructed with the assistance of U.S. firm General Electric (GE) in the 1990s. The explosion, reportedly visible from over 15 kilometres away, erased the facility both physically and from Pakistan’s official memory — a fact confirmed by post-strike satellite imagery and intelligence analysis.
Why is a C4I (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence) base so important to a country’s military?
A C4I base is critical to a country’s military strength because it serves as the central nervous system for military operations. Here's why it's so important:
1. Centralized Command and Control : C4I systems allow military commanders to coordinate forces across land, air, sea, and cyber domains in real-time. Without this central command, military responses become slow, uncoordinated, and vulnerable to chaos during conflict.
2. Real-Time Communication : C4I infrastructure enables secure, instant communication between high command and units in the field. This ensures that orders are issued, received, and updated without delays—even during electronic warfare or cyberattacks.
3. Integrated Intelligence Processing : C4I centres fuse intelligence from satellites, UAVs, radars, and human sources to create a real-time operational picture. This helps in detecting threats early, planning missions, and making informed decisions.
4. Computational Power for Battle Management : These bases use powerful computers to run simulations, analyze battlefield data, and help commanders anticipate enemy actions. This computational capability is essential for high-tech warfare.
5. Force Multiplier : With effective C4I, even a smaller or less numerous military force can outperform a larger adversary by acting faster, smarter, and more precisely. It's a force multiplier that amplifies overall combat efficiency.
6. Resilience and Continuity of Government (COG) : C4I facilities often double as strategic command centres during crises, including nuclear escalation or homeland attacks. Destroying one can cripple a nation’s ability to defend, respond, or retaliate, making them high-priority targets.
7. Protection of Strategic Assets : They help in monitoring and protecting nuclear assets, missile defences, and airspace integrity. Without functioning C4I, a country may lose the ability to detect or respond to a strategic threat in time.
The targeted facility was more than just a Command and Control (C2) centre; it was a fully integrated C4I system housed within a Hardened Deeply Buried Target (HDBT) — a military term for reinforced underground bunkers designed to survive conventional and nuclear strikes. The Nur Khan facility was a critical nerve centre, allegedly used for the integration of Pakistan’s air surveillance data, radar inputs, tactical communications, and possibly coordination of strategic responses, including nuclear contingencies.
Built using cutting-edge construction technologies allegedly shared by General Electric in the 1990s — in return for a now-declassified Pakistani agreement to suspend nuclear cold tests at Kirana Hills — the facility covered 750 square metres underground. Its walls and roof were reinforced with multiple layers of rebar-reinforced concrete, designed to withstand even precision-guided bunker-busting munitions. Over the years, the centre was twice renovated (2005 and 2015), not only expanding its infrastructure but also reportedly updating its simulation and data fusion capabilities.
The attack on this HDBT was anything but ordinary. IAF planners and intelligence agencies, likely relying on Geologic Assessment Methodology for Underground Targets (GAMUT), zeroed in on a 45 cm-wide HVAC (Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning) shaft that led directly into the heart of the facility. This tiny opening — practically unmeasurable on open-source satellite imagery — was the only weak spot in an otherwise impenetrable fortress.
High-resolution satellite data, multi-source HUMINT (Human Intelligence), and perhaps hyperspectral ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) assets were all utilized to map this shaft. The missile used for the attack — likely a smart bomb or modified air-to-ground munition with terrain-following guidance — was pre-fed with GPS coordinates, structural blueprints, and high-fidelity 3D imaging to ensure zero error. A pilot with the highest qualification would have been handpicked for this operation.
When the munition hit, it penetrated through the 45 cm HVAC shaft, reaching the core of the command bunker. The resulting underground explosion was so powerful that it caused the multilayered reinforced concrete roof to rupture upwards, ejecting massive debris and effectively vaporizing everything inside — equipment, personnel, and data systems. The fireball was so intense that it was visible from a distance of over 15 kilometres.
In the immediate aftermath, there was no official Pakistani acknowledgment. The silence was deafening. Satellite images showed the site untouched for nearly four days post-strike, indicating uncertainty within the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) and possibly internal deliberations on damage control. It is believed that the decision was made to bury the dead in situ — as not even recoverable remains could be salvaged from the obliterated structure.
Heavy machinery — including JCBs and concrete mixers — was observed levelling the blast site and sealing it with fresh concrete slabs. Within days, the site had been sanitised. By the time international analysts revisited imagery, there was no trace of the once-celebrated C4I hub. It was as if it had never existed.
Strategically, the Nur Khan C4I bunker represented Pakistan’s most advanced attempt to digitally integrate its radar networks, air defence command hierarchy, and electronic warfare data. Analysts from the Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS) suggest that all intelligence gathered by ISR aircraft and new radar systems in the last decade was being transmitted here for real-time fusion with legacy systems — a critical function during airspace incursions or missile attacks.
Its loss, therefore, wasn’t just tactical — it was systemic. The facility served as a backbone for decision-making, particularly for air defence and perhaps even nuclear second-strike coordination. Destroying it was the equivalent of severing the central nervous system of a body, leaving it functionally paralysed.
Globally, HDBTs are hard to detect, harder to strike, and almost impossible to completely destroy — unless you know exactly how they are built and where the vulnerabilities lie. The successful Indian strike showcases not only IAF’s growing technological and operational edge but also the maturing capability of its space and air surveillance systems.
Operation Sindoor also reportedly targeted a second HDBT at Murid Airbase, believed to house another C2 facility. Both attacks demonstrate India’s calibrated use of conventional force under its No-First-Use (NFU) nuclear doctrine, carefully designed to neutralise command infrastructure without crossing the nuclear threshold.
The destruction of the Nur Khan HDBT C4I facility marks a pivotal moment in modern air power projection in South Asia. It signals that even the most fortified installations, designed with foreign assistance and buried deep underground, are no longer safe from precision warfare.
Pakistan’s silence on the event only underscores its severity. The absence of acknowledgement, public mourning, or media coverage tells its own story — of a loss too great to admit. For India, the success of this operation is a testament to the evolution of its strategic deterrence and surgical strike capabilities.
In a world where deep-buried facilities were once considered untouchable, Operation Sindoor has rewritten the rules of engagement — with a 45 cm-wide hole.
Sources: Open-source satellite imagery analysis, CAPS India policy paper, DGMO press releases, interviews with retired IAF officers, and defence intelligence assessments.