US NSA McMaster Exposes Pakistan's ISI Complicity with Terrorists
In a startling revelation, former US National Security Advisor Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster has pulled back the curtain on Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and its deep-rooted connections with terrorist organizations. McMaster's insights, detailed in his latest book *At War with Ourselves: My Tour of Duty in the Trump White House*, offer a sobering look at the challenges he faced during his tenure, particularly in curbing the flow of US aid to Pakistan, a country he describes as complicit in harboring and supporting terrorists.
Under the Trump administration, a key priority was to halt all security aid to Pakistan until it ceased providing safe havens for terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan and beyond. President Donald Trump was vocal in his disdain for the perceived duplicity of Pakistan, famously tweeting on New Year's Day that the United States had been "foolishly" giving Pakistan billions in aid, only to receive "lies & deceit" in return.
Despite Trump's clear directives, McMaster encountered significant resistance from within the US government. Both the State Department and the Pentagon were hesitant to cut off aid, fearing potential repercussions. One of the most striking examples of this internal struggle occurred when then-Defense Secretary Jim Mattis planned to deliver a military aid package to Islamabad, including over $150 million worth of armored vehicles. This move was in direct contradiction to the South Asia strategy Trump had approved, which called for a suspension of all aid except in very limited circumstances.
McMaster recounts how he had to intervene personally to stop the aid package from being delivered. He convened a high-level meeting that included Mattis, CIA Deputy Director Gina Haspel, and other senior officials to underscore the importance of adhering to the president's policy. The discussion highlighted the deep-seated concerns within the administration about Pakistan's ongoing support for terrorist organizations, which were not only undermining US efforts in Afghanistan but also posing a direct threat to American and coalition forces.
The ISI's involvement with terrorist groups was further exposed during a hostage crisis in Pakistan, which McMaster cites as undeniable proof of the agency's complicity. The timing of Pakistan’s actions, such as the release of Hafiz Saeed—the mastermind behind the 2008 Mumbai attacks—on the eve of Mattis’s visit to Islamabad, seemed almost calculated to mock US efforts to curb terrorism. This blatant disregard for international norms and US demands only served to reinforce the perception that Pakistan, and particularly its intelligence agency, was playing a double game.
Despite these revelations, McMaster found it difficult to get the State Department and the Pentagon to fully comply with Trump’s directives. The internal resistance was so strong that it became a significant obstacle to implementing the administration’s broader South Asia strategy, which aimed to recalibrate the US-Pakistan relationship in light of the latter’s duplicitous actions.
McMaster's book provides a candid account of the bureaucratic inertia that often stymied efforts to hold Pakistan accountable. His experience highlights the complexities of foreign policy, where even clear directives from the highest levels of government can be undermined by competing interests and concerns about unintended consequences.
The former NSA’s revelations about Pakistan’s ISI are a stark reminder of the challenges the US has faced in its fight against terrorism. While the Trump administration may have been more vocal and decisive in its approach, the struggle to hold Pakistan accountable for its actions remains a contentious issue that continues to shape US foreign policy in the region.
